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This Article conducts an empirical analysis of the relative ages of patents liti-
gated by practicing and nonpracticing entities (NPEs). By studying all infringement 
claims for a sample of recently expired patents, I find considerable differences in 
litigation practices between these groups. Product-producing companies usually 
enforce their patents soon after issuance and complete their enforcement activities 
well before their patent rights expire. NPEs, by contrast, begin asserting their 
patents relatively late in the patent term and frequently continue to litigate until 
expiration. This variance in litigation timing is so dramatic that all claims assert-
ing the average product-company patent are resolved before the average NPE 
patent is asserted for the first time. Further, I find that NPEs are the dominant 
source of patent enforcement in the final few years of the patent term. NPEs, 
enforcers of just twenty percent of all studied patents, are responsible for more than 
two-thirds of all suits and over eighty percent of all infringement claims litigated in 
the final three years of the patent term. These findings cast serious doubt on the 
utility of the last few years of the patent term and suggest that Congress should, at a 
minimum, consider increasing the frequency and magnitude of maintenance fee 
payments in the latter half of the term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The impact nonpracticing entities (NPEs), or “patent trolls,” have on 
innovation may be the most important empirical question in patent law 
today. So far, however, scholars have analyzed litigation brought by various 
types of patent owners in a fragmented and indirect fashion. Some scholars 
have studied only the most litigious or easily identifiable trolls.1 Such 
studies miss as much as 85% of NPE-asserted patents.2 Others have focused 
 
1 See John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 
GEO. L.J. 677, 681-83 (2011) [hereinafter Allison, Patent Quality and Settlement] (comparing patents 
asserted eight or more times with patents asserted just once); John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value 
or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) 
[hereinafter Allison, Extreme Value] (same); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 457, 460 (2012) (studying only “the ten most litigious NPEs”); see also Sannu K. Shrestha, 
Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
114, 143 & n.160 (2010) (studying patent infringement cases filed by fifty-one NPEs identified in 
the press).  
2 Throughout this Article I refer to a dataset that I compiled using a random sample of 472 
litigated patents that issued in 1993 and 1994. For a detailed discussion of my sample selection and 
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exclusively on litigation filed during a handful of years in the last decade.3 
These studies fail to account for the vast differences among patents that 
happen to be litigated at the same time. It makes little sense, for example, 
to compare the first and only litigation of a one-year-old medical-device 
patent to the twentieth litigation of a nineteen-year-old software patent, 
even if both proceed contemporaneously.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, these narrow studies have produced results at 
odds with one another. The empirical literature examining NPEs is, to put 
it mildly, internally inconsistent. Some studies strongly suggest that NPEs 
are every bit the tail that wags the dog. NPEs, for example, assert the lion’s 
share of “most-litigated” patents4 and are especially dominant in high-tech 
fields, where patents tend to be plentiful, cheap, and broad.5 Others report 
the exact opposite. Trolls really don’t exist at all,6 exist but are exceedingly 
 
data collection efforts, see infra Sections I.B–C. References to the information on patents and 
cases in my dataset are cited throughout this Article to the Timing Dataset. Where the data relates 
to the litigation of a particular patent, I include the patent number in the citation. The data is on 
file with the author. 
In the sample of cases gathered for this study, about 14% of NPE-asserted patents (twelve of 
eighty-eight) were litigated in eight or more suits. About 7% (six of eighty-eight) were asserted by 
the ten NPEs studied by Michael Risch. See Timing Dataset. 
3 See Allison, Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note 1, at 682 (studying litigation brought 
between 2000 and 2009); Allison, Extreme Value, supra note 1, at 5 (studying litigation brought be-
tween 2000 and 2007); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and 
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1593 (2009) (studying high-tech 
cases filed between January 2000 and March 2008); Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transac-
tion Costs and Trolls: Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in 
Patent Litigation 2 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Papers Series, Research Papers Series No. 08-21, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337166 (studying cases filed between 2000 and 2002). 
4 Allison, Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note 1, at 692-93 figs.2 & 3 (reporting that 
NPEs filed 63.5% of the patent cases involving a patent litigated eight or more times, but just 21% 
of cases involving a patent litigated only once). 
5 See id. at 695-96 & tbl.10 (reporting that over 74% of the most litigated patents cover 
software-related inventions); Chien, supra note 3, at 1600, 1604 (reporting that NPEs filed 17% of 
patent suits and were a party to 28% of patent claims in high-tech industries); Mark A. Lemley & 
Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (estimating 
that NPEs file 30-40% of patent suits in the computer and electronic industries). 
6 See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law 
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1586 (2009) (“Some believe the troll label is a meaningless 
epithet, applied only to a plaintiff in a patent lawsuit with whom one has a legal conflict.”); 
Michael C. Smith, “Patent Pirates” Only Exist in Neverland, TEX. LAW., Oct. 11, 2004, available at 
http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern_district_of_texas/files/patent_pirates_exist_only_in_neverland.pdf 
(“[P]laintiffs in patent litigation are hardly pirates—they are simply investors who bought an asset 
and seek a return on their money.”); Innovators Fear the Patent Trolls, TMCNET (May 7, 2006), 
http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2006/05/07/1639931.htm (“Patent trolls ‘don’t exist. Trolls are 
imaginary creatures . . . . I think the whole issue is overblown.’” (quoting Carl Gulbrandsen, 
Managing Dir., Wis. Alumni Research Found.)). 
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rare,7 or exist in modest numbers but hold few of the traits attributed to 
them by their detractors.8  
This Article fills these gaps in the existing literature by studying a broad 
cross-section of patents over the entire patent term. Rather than studying a 
subset of patents linked by litigiousness or contemporaneous court filings, I 
study all patent enforcement for a random sample of recently expired patents.  
With this data, I can for the first time account for the relative timing of 
lawsuits filed by practicing and nonpracticing entities. My findings are 
dramatic: opposing views of NPEs in the literature ring true but at opposite 
ends of the patent term. Product-producing companies predominantly 
enforce their patents soon after they issue and complete their enforcement 
activities well before their patents expire. NPEs, on the other hand, begin 
asserting their patents relatively late in the patent term and frequently 
continue to litigate their patents to expiration. Indeed, I find that the 
average product-company patent has been shelved by its owner before the 
average NPE patent has even been asserted.  
The degree to which NPEs dominate the final few years of the patent 
term is especially surprising. Though asserting just over 20% of all studied 
patents, NPEs account for more than two-thirds of suits and over 80% of 
infringement claims litigated in the final three years of the patent term. 
Notably, NPEs’ domination of late-term litigation is almost completely 
attributable to firms that do nothing more than hold patents. NPEs that 
many do not consider trolls—universities9 and individual inventors10 in 
particular—do not drive the results reported below. 
 
7 Ball & Kesan, supra note 3, at 25 (concluding that the “number of patent licensing firms—
the most obvious candidate for the role of troll—active in cases filed . . . was quite modest”); 
Nathan Myhrvold, Op-Ed., Inventors Have Rights, Too!, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at A14 
(“Court records show that only 2% of all patent lawsuits are due to plaintiffs that have no ongoing 
product business.”). 
8 See Risch, supra note 1, at 474-91 (testing many of the common criticisms of NPEs and 
concluding that “most of the criticism is based on a few, perhaps anecdotal, cases”); Shrestha, supra 
note 1, at 148-49 (finding that “NPEs may be demanding high royalty fees not because of 
opportunism, but because their patents are, in fact, more valuable” and that “NPE patents have 
had considerable influence on subsequent patents and are also not trivial improvements in a 
particular technology class”). 
9 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 611, 629 (2008) (arguing that universities are not patent trolls, at least in part because 
they are “not engaged in hiding the ball, waiting until people have developed an industry and then 
popping up and demanding a disproportionate share of royalties”); Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Remarks at the Eastern District Bench Bar: The State 
of Patent Litigation (Irving, Tex. Sept. 27, 2011) (“[T]he NPE designation sweeps in some 
unintended ‘culprits’ like universities and research clinics and can also extend to almost every 
corporation and business because they practice only a fraction of their patent portfolio.”). But see 
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I also compare the relative litigiousness of product-producing companies 
and NPEs, as well as differences in the subject matter and strength of their 
infringement claims. In addition to my overall findings, I report how these 
statistics change among patents litigated in the final years of the patent 
term. I find that NPEs are especially litigious: they overwhelmingly assert 
high-tech patents and lose at a relatively high rate when their infringement 
claims are adjudicated on the merits. The same is true for patents litigated 
late in the patent term: NPEs are more litigious, more high-tech focused, 
and more likely to lose on the merits of their infringement claims. Interest-
ingly, an outsized percentage of product producing–company patents liti-
gated late in the term are high-tech related. These patents are asserted by a 
unique group of companies, which sell a product and yet blur the line 
between practicing entities and trolls. 
My findings add to mounting evidence that the costs of NPE litigation 
outweigh their benefits. In fact, they cast serious doubt on NPEs’ chief 
alleged benefits: that paper patentees help create a market for innovation 
and contribute to the dissemination of useful technology. Instead, NPEs 
overwhelmingly wait to assert their rights until the underlying technology 
is stale and unlikely to be of much use to accused infringers that inde-
pendently developed the technology themselves years earlier.11 Overall, my 
findings suggest that Congress should shorten the patent term by three 
years or even longer.12 In these final years of patent protection, more than 
80% of patent assertions are brought by patent-holding firms that have no 
intention of commercializing a product. Much of the remaining litigation is 
brought by product-producing companies asserting high-tech patents, often 
with far less than ideal motivation. At the very least, Congress or the Patent 
 
Merges, supra note 6, at 1611 (“[U]niversities, at least some of them, have crossed the line between 
innovators and rent-seekers.” (footnote omitted)). 
10 Chien, supra note 3, at 1587 (arguing that individual inventors should not be considered 
NPEs). 
11 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1421, 1444-46 (2009) (finding that allegations of copying are rare in patent litigation, especially in 
cases asserting high-tech patents); see also Markus Reitzig et al., On Sharks, Trolls, and Their Patent 
Prey—Unrealistic Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed,” 36 RES. POL’Y 134, 150 
(2007) (developing a model of NPE behavior suggesting that the NPEs can “act most profitably as 
sharks” when asserted patents are infringed inadvertently); John L. Turner, Patent Thickets, 
Trolls and Unproductive Entrepreneurship 23 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916798 (“[W]hen the frequency of inadvertent infringement is 
smaller . . . [,] my model predicts that trolls will cause less of a change in rates of invention and 
patenting and that their presence will harm welfare less.”). 
12 For a discussion of study limitations that temper this recommendation, including a discus-
sion of NPEs’ ability to simply file suit earlier in the event of a term reduction, see infra Section 
III.C. 
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and Trademark Office (PTO) should consider increasing the frequency and 
magnitude of maintenance fee payments required in the latter half of the 
patent term.  
I. STUDY DESIGN 
On the issue of patent reform, a civil war of sorts divides the technology 
community.13 Battle lines are drawn largely between industries. Pharmaceu-
tical companies, on one side, argue that strong patent rights are crucial to 
continued innovation.14 High-tech firms, on the other, view the patent 
system as more foe than friend.15 According to these firms, and many 
scholars and patent attorneys, the patent system is too often a vehicle for 
“patent trolls”—entities that assert patents they do not use and frequently 
did not invent—to extract undeserved royalties from “true” innovators 
working to build successful new high-tech products.16  
How these opposing views of the patent system should be reconciled 
turns in large part on questions concerning the utility of NPEs. Are NPEs 
the pervasive litigation-cost “extortionists” their detractors make them out 
to be?17 Or are they, as their defenders contend, small-time players that help 
 
13 See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 4 (2009) (“Any doubts that the patent system is perceived by different 
industries in fundamentally different ways were dispelled during the course of congressional 
debates over patent reform in the four years beginning in 2005. The reform process ground to a 
halt because different industries couldn’t agree on a single principle of reform.”); Merges, supra 
note 6, at 1608-09 (“[R]ecent battles over patent reform in Congress show that there is a major 
divergence between the interests of the biomedical industries . . . and information technology 
companies . . . .”). 
14 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 4 (“In the pharmaceutical industry, there seems to 
be a strong consensus . . . that patents are critical to innovation.”). 
15 See id. (“[T]he information technology industries . . . almost invariably see the patent 
system as a cost rather than a benefit to innovation.”). 
16 Patent “trolls” are so named because their behavior bears resemblance to mythological 
trolls who emerge without warning from beneath bridges to demand a toll from all who would 
pass. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1814 (2007) (“The ensuing litigation comes as a surprise to a 
defendant, which is why these suits are analogized to mythical trolls that hid under bridges and 
leapt out to demand a ransom from travelers.”). 
17 Timothy J. Haller & Sally Wiggins, The Patent Troll Myth, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., 
http://www.buildingipvalue.com/06US_Can/113_116.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013); see Magliocca, 
supra note 16, at 1816 (“[Patent trolls] acquire an invention and then refuse to do anything until the 
technology becomes an industry standard. This behavior is akin to setting a deliberate trap and is 
not permitted elsewhere in the law.”); Merges, supra note 6, at 1600-02 (comparing the patent troll 
business model to blackmail); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 
(2010) (noting that NPEs “tend to exploit litigation and licensing market defects to extract 
unwarranted rents from commercializers”); see also Rader, supra note 9, at 8 (“[E]xpenses can force 
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disseminate useful technology,18 create markets for inventions,19 and 
provide capital for inventors?20 
A. Hypotheses 
Unfortunately, the existing literature has done little to settle the debate. 
One reason is that, even after several studies on the topic, commentators 
cannot agree on the percentage of patent enforcement attributable to NPEs. 
Results have been all over the map. NPEs, or some “trollish” subset thereof, 
account for 2%,21 4%,22 22%,23 or 27%24 of patent litigation depending on 
whom you ask. Though diverse, these relatively modest estimates have led 
at least one scholar to declare that “the uniform findings indicate that NPEs 
file only a small fraction of all patent infringement suits.”25 Other clues, 
however, suggest that NPEs have anything but a modest effect on the 
 
accused infringers to acquiesce to non-meritorious claims. This only serves as an unhealthy tax on 
innovation and open competition.”). 
18 See Brian D. Kacedon et al., Patent Trolls: A Stereotype Causes a Backlash Against Patents and 
Licensing, FINNEGAN (Dec. 2006), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx? 
news=c49b5d62-61bf-4d90-99ad-30d4d6e9da23 (noting that the patent licensing community 
“performs a central role in helping commercial entities obtain the rights to use valuable technolo-
gies that produce new and beneficial products”). 
19 See James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View 
of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 211 (2006) (“[Patent trolls] 
make the patent market more efficient through buying and licensing patents. Patent dealers create 
a credible threat of litigation, which encourages exchange, makes patents more liquid, and 
facilitates market clearing through price equalization.”). 
20 See, e.g., John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Funded Startup 
Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 170, 171-72 (2006) (noting that venture capital firms have 
begun to “assess and remarket the intellectual property of failed startup firms”); Ronald J. Mann, 
Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1024 (2005) (“[T]rolls 
are serving a function as intermediaries that specialize in litigation to exploit the value of patents 
that cannot be exploited effectively by those that have originally obtained them.”). 
21 Myhrvold, supra note 7. 
22 Ball & Kesan, supra note 3, at 15 (finding that “3% of plaintiffs, who were active in 4% of 
the cases, were licensing firms”). 
23 Compare Patent Cases by United States District Court, LEX MACHINA ( Jan. 15, 2013) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter LEX MACHINA] (reporting that 2541 patent cases were filed in U.S. 
district courts in 2008, 2521 in 2009, and 2724 in 2010), with Litigations Over Time, PATENT 
FREEDOM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations (last updated Jan. 18, 2012) 
(showing that there were 559 NPE-filed suits in 2008, 546 in 2009, and 623 in 2010). 
24 See Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 314 (finding in a 
sample of litigated patents issued in 1990 that 27% were asserted by either a “patent assertion 
entity” or an individual); Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetiza-
tion Entities on U.S. Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 375-78 (finding, in a study of 100 
patent suits filed each year from 2007 to 2011, that the percentage attributable to NPEs was 
roughly 22% in 2007, 27% in 2008, 33% in 2009, 30% in 2010, and 40% in 2011). 
25 Risch, supra note 1, at 466. 
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patent system. One study found that NPEs owned more than 60% of 
patents litigated eight times or more,26 and multiple studies have found that 
NPEs file as much as 40% of suits asserting high-tech patents.27  
What accounts for these seemingly inconsistent results? This Article 
argues that existing studies of NPE litigation are incomplete because they 
fail to take into account differences in the relative ages of patents asserted 
by practicing and nonpracticing entities. It further suggests that all previous 
empirical studies underestimate NPEs’ true impact because they fail to 
compare NPE patents with other patents of the same age. 
To date, no empirical studies have accounted for time in examining 
patent litigation by NPEs.28 This omission is surprising because there is 
good reason to believe that product-producing companies and NPEs assert 
their patents on very different timelines. If, as many suggest, product-
producing companies value their patents for exclusionary power,29 these 
companies should file suit (if at all) soon after their patents issue to fend off 
competitors that are developing or introducing similar products.30 In 
addition, because products generally have short lifecycles relative to the 
patent term31 and next generation products may be protected by newer 
patents, practicing patentees should generally cease litigating a patent well 
 
26 See Allison, Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note 1, at 690, 692. 
27 See Chien, supra note 3, at 1600, 1604 (reporting that NPEs file 17% of patent suits and are 
a party to 28% of patent claims in hardware and software industries); Lemley & Shapiro, supra 
note 5, at 2009 (estimating that NPEs file 30-40% of patent suits involving computer and 
electronic technology). 
28 For example, Michael Risch found that highly litigious NPEs asserted their patents an 
average of 8.3 years after issue, but he did not compare this delay with data on when product-
producing companies do the same. Risch, supra note 1, at 490. 
29 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 286 (2009) (noting 
that NPEs and product-producing companies “have asymmetrical incentives, since trolls are only 
interested in exacting payments”). 
30 Product-producing companies are also discouraged from delaying patent enforcement until 
the patented technology matures by the risk that doing so will give their competitors time to 
amass their own arsenal of patents, which they could use to file a successful counterclaim. See, e.g., 
Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors: IP 
Privateering and Modern Letters of Marque and Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 35 (2012) 
(“Each company views its patent armamentarium as an instrument of mutually assured destruc-
tion, e.g., if one company sues another for patent infringement, then retaliation is guaranteed.”). 
Because NPEs do not sell products that could be the subject of a counterclaim, they do not face 
this risk when filing suit. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Patent Litigation and the Internet, STAN. 
TECH. L. REV., no. 3, 2012, at 5, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/allison-patent-litigation.pdf (“[NPEs] 
do not make or sell products and thus are not vulnerable to patent infringement counterclaims, as 
are product companies that sue for infringement. NPEs consequently may be less reluctant to sue.”). 
31 In the computer industry, for example, products become twice as powerful about every 
two years. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (describing Moore’s law). 
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before it expires and move on to litigating newer patents covering newer 
products. 
By contrast, there is good reason to believe that NPEs overwhelmingly 
litigate their patents late in the patent term. For one, many NPEs do not 
file their own patent applications, but instead purchase patents on the 
secondary market (often from failed companies32) for the purposes of 
litigation.33 Naturally, it takes time for such patents to reach NPEs.34 
Further, because NPEs primarily value patents for their usefulness in 
extracting royalties and damages from product-producing companies,35 
these patentees should generally wait to file suit until a lucrative industry 
has developed and continue to file suits as long as deep-pocketed targets 
remain.36 
If these characterizations are rooted in fact rather than anecdote, it 
makes little sense to base patent policy on calculations of the bare percent-
age of NPE suits among those brought during some year or group of years. 
Product-producing companies are far and away the chief players in the 
patent system and such studies will always reflect this fact.37 What these 
studies cannot reflect, however, is whether NPEs begin to have a dispropor-
tionate effect at some point during the patent term and how such a finding 
would color NPEs’ (and their defenders’) claims that they are beneficial 
market makers and disseminators of technology.  
B. Compiling a Database 
To test these hypotheses, I set out to collect data on all litigation assert-
ing a sample of recently expired patents. Using Westlaw and PACER,38 I 
 
32 See Risch, supra note 1, at 489 (finding in a study of patents acquired by NPEs that more 
than 14% of the original patent-holder companies were no longer operating and suggesting that 
another 13% may have been in financial distress). 
33 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 29, at 286 (“Patent trolls are firms that aggregate patents for 
technology that they usually did not themselves create and do not themselves use, but for which 
they seek to exact royalty payments from commercial users.”). 
34 See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
35 See supra note 29. 
36 See Mann, supra note 20, at 1027 (noting the “especially damaging” strategy of “waiting 
after a patent has been issued while an industry advances using the covered technology and then 
suing widely for infringement only after the industry has become locked into the technology 
through independent innovation and development”); Merges, supra note 6, at 1590-91 (“The 
patent troll strategy is to take advantage of ‘lock-in’ that occurs as a result of [sunk cost] invest-
ments. Typically, the troll waits until a technology is fully entrenched before scouting around for 
patents to acquire or asserting patents it holds.” (footnote omitted)). 
37 See infra Figure 1. 
38 See PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (cataloguing case and 
docket information from federal litigations). 
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located every litigated39 patent40 that issued with a patent number falling 
between 5,210,000 and 5,309,999. These patents issued between May 11, 
1993, and May 10, 1994 (“the study period”).41  
As shown in Table 1, I identified 1180 patents issued during the study 
period42 that were litigated in a district court (including in U.S. territories) 
or the Court of Federal Claims, or at the International Trade Commission 
(ITC).43 In the ninety district courts located in the fifty states and the 
 
39 Here and throughout, by “litigated” I mean asserted in an action raising a claim for in-
fringement (or for a declaration of noninfringement or invalidity) of the studied patent, as 
opposed to merely involved in litigation concerning ownership, inventorship, antitrust, contract, 
trademark, copyright, or other patent claims. For an additional discussion of the kinds of cases 
that were excluded from the study because they were not patent infringement cases, see infra 
Section I.C. 
40 Here and throughout, I use “patent” to refer exclusively to “utility” patents. This study 
does not include design patents or plant patents, both of which are protected by separate statutory 
schemes. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171–173 (2006) (covering design patents) (amended 2012); id. §§ 161–
164 (covering plant patents). 
41 Under the law in effect at the time these patents issued, each would have expired between 
May 11, 2010, and May 10, 2011. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (setting the patent term at seventeen 
years from the date of issue). Legislation passed in December 1994 modifying the patent term for 
patents then-in-force to the longer of seventeen years from issue or twenty years from filing. 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 532, § 154(c)(1), 108 Stat. 4809, 4984-
85 (1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (2006)). Because an application spends on 
average close to three years at the PTO, these calculations generally provide a similar term of 
protection. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States 
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 98 (2002) (finding that patents issued between 1996 and 1998 
spent an average of 2.8 years in prosecution). Many patents, however, receive a modest extension 
under the new law. See Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 
AIPLA Q.J. 369, 385 (1994) (finding that, on average, the new rule for patent terms extended 
patentees’ rights by 253 days).  
42 The earliest patent issued on May 11, 1993. U.S. Patent No. 5,210,272 (filed Aug. 14, 1991). 
The latest issued on May 10, 1994. U.S. Patent No. 5,309,861 (filed Aug. 5, 1992). The rate of 
assertion during the study period (1.2%) is consistent with prior estimates of litigated patents. See 
Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2001) 
(“[A]t most only about two percent of all patents are ever litigated . . . .”). 
43 Patent suits fall within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts, 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a), and may generally be brought in any United States district court which has 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945) (“[D]ue process requires . . . that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts 
with it . . . .”), and where venue is proper, see 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (permitting a suit for patent 
infringement in any judicial district in which “the defendant resides” or “the defendant has 
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business”). However, 
patent claims against the United States must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. 28 
U.S.C. § 1498(a). Another exception is that the ITC has jurisdiction to investigate and exclude 
imported goods that infringe a United States patent from entry into the country. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), (c), (d). ITC orders barring the entry of infringing goods may be appealed to 
the Court of International Trade. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
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District of Columbia, court clerks’ offices report basic information on patent 
suits to the PTO, and searchable copies of these reports are available via 
Westlaw’s Derwent LitAlert database.44 From these reports I identified 1159 
patents.45 The LitAlert database, however, does not include records for 
cases filed in the District Court of Puerto Rico and the three territorial 
district courts.46 To locate all patents asserted solely in these courts, I 
searched PACER docket reports and pleadings (where available47) for all 
patent cases brought in each court during or after 1993 and cross-referenced 
these results with all relevant patent numbers cited in opinions or orders 
issued by these courts over the same period. From these records I found 
another two unique patent numbers and two duplicates.48 Similarly, to 
locate all patents asserted solely against the United States, I searched 
PACER docket reports and pleadings for all patent cases brought in the 
Court of Federal Claims during or after 1993 and cross-referenced these 
results with opinions or orders issued by the court. This search identified 
another seven unique patent numbers and one duplicate.49 Finally, to locate 
 
Circuit holds appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International 
Trade, and all patent-related cases brought in district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (3), (5). 
44 Searching the LitAlert database confirms that all ninety districts located in the fifty states 
and the District of Columbia submitted litigation reports to the PTO throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. Thus, any missing patents should be attributable to idiosyncratic oversight rather than 
systematic failure of any particular district to file reports with the PTO. 
45 Patents from this timeframe were asserted in seventy-four of the ninety districts. See Tim-
ing Dataset. Based on patent filing data from Lex Machina, these seventy-four districts account for 
over 98% of patent suits filed since 2000. See LEX MACHINA, supra note 23. And the top forty-six 
of those districts, ranked by number of patent filings since 2000, are represented in the dataset I 
analyze. Compare id., with Timing Dataset. 
46 These three territorial courts are the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, the 
District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands. That these courts are 
excluded is not surprising given that the District Court of Puerto Rico and the three territorial 
districts collectively receive about one patent case per year. See LEX MACHINA, supra note 23 
(reporting just fourteen patent suits filed in these four districts between 2000 and 2010). Virtually 
all of these cases were filed in the District of Puerto Rico. See id.  
47 Starting around the year 2000 and gradually increasing thereafter on a district-by-district 
basis, federal courts have published filings and orders online in PDF format. Prior to electronic 
filing, docket entries were described only briefly on docket reports. Thus, despite personally hand-
searching patent dockets in these districts, my dataset is potentially underinclusive for the District 
Court of Puerto Rico, the territorial district courts, and the Court of Federal Claims. See Allison, 
Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note 1, at 682 n.22 (describing the limitations in data collected 
from PACER by the Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse). Nonetheless, collection in this 
manner gives “the best, most representative data set available.” Id. 
48 I identified a total of four patents issued during the study period that were asserted in a 
territorial district court, but two were also asserted in a district court.  
49 I identified a total of eight patents issued during the study period that were asserted in the 
Court of Federal Claims, but one was also asserted in a district court.  
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patents asserted only at the ITC,50 I searched Westlaw’s database of ITC 
filings and cross-referenced these results with all relevant patent numbers 
cited in opinions or orders issued by the United States Court of Inter-
national Trade in or after 1993.51 Here, I found another twelve unique 
patent numbers and twenty-two duplicates. 
 
Table 1: Database Composition by Venue52 
Venue Total 
Patents 
Unique Database Source 
U.S. Dist. Cts. 1159 -- 
Westlaw: LITALERT 
 
U.S. Territorial Cts. 4 2 
PACER; Westlaw: DCTGU,  
DCTMP, DCTPR, DCTVI 
Ct. of Fed. Claims 8 7 
PACER; Westlaw: FEDCL 
 
ITC/Ct. of Int’l 
Trade 
34 12 
Westlaw: USITC-FILINGS, FINT-
CIT 
 
C. Sampling and Data Collection 
From these 1180 patents, I randomly selected a sample of 472 (exactly 
two-fifths) to investigate in depth. From this smaller sample, I excluded 
fifty-one patents because they were never asserted against an alleged patent 
infringer. Of these fifty-one, fourteen patents were involved solely in 
litigation brought to resolve a dispute between putative owners or inventors. 
Thirteen more were involved in patent false-marking cases brought after 
the patents’ expiration.53 Another eighteen were not litigated, but only cited 
 
50 Technically, the ITC’s jurisdiction is in rem, so the suit is brought against the allegedly 
infringing goods themselves. See, e.g., Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 
976, 985-86 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (noting that an ITC order to exclude products from entry into the 
United States operates “against goods, not parties”). 
51 Westlaw’s coverage of ITC filings dates back to December 1994. See Scope USITC-
FILINGS, WESTLAW CLASSIC, https://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?db=USITC-FILINGS 
&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WLW12.10&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=_top&MT=208&MST= (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2013). Thus, this dataset is underinclusive to the extent that patents issued during 
the study period were asserted at the ITC within twelve to eighteen months of their issue. 
52 See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text. 
53 In the past, it was unlawful to mark a product with an expired patent number. See 
Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that a “now-
expired patent” was “unpatented” under 35 U.S.C. § 292(a), which prohibits marking unpatented 
products with the word “patent” “for the purpose of deceiving the public”). The Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act clarified that an expired patent does not violate § 292. See Pub. L. No. 112-
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in pleadings.54 Five additional patent numbers were excluded because they 
contained typographical errors,55 and one final patent was erroneously 
asserted long after it had expired for failure to pay maintenance fees. 
For each of the remaining 421 patents, I collected a variety of data to 
determine when the patents were asserted, how many times they were 
asserted, and against whom they were asserted. In order to compare the 
relative ages of patents asserted by practicing and nonpracticing entities, I 
categorized the party enforcing each patent using patentee classes developed 
by Mark Lemley and Nathan Myhrvold.56 Finally, in order to compare the 
diversity of technology enforced by practicing and nonpracticing entities, I 
categorized the invention claimed in each patent using technology and 
industry classes developed by Lemley, John Allison, and Joshua Walker.57 
1. Prosecution Data 
First, to calculate each patent’s term, I determined the date on which 
each patent was filed and issued.58 Specifically, I identified the filing date of 
each patent’s application, or of the earliest United States parent application59 
to which it claims priority.60 I also identified whether each patent’s owner 
 
29, § 16(b)(3), 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 292(c) (2006)) (“The marking of a 
product . . . with matter relating to a patent that covered that product but has expired is not a 
violation of this section.”). 
54 Seven patents were cited as prior art in an answer or declaratory judgment complaint. 
Eleven were cited for other extraneous reasons in pleadings bringing claims for trademark 
infringement, copyright infringement, unfair competition, or breach of contract. 
55 Westlaw’s Derwent LitAlert database was rife with erroneously transcribed patent numbers. 
In the vast majority of cases, I was able to reverse-engineer the correct patent number. The vast 
majority of corrected patent numbers issued within the study period, but a small minority did not. 
56 See Allison, Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note 1, at 683-84 (describing the typology 
of entity-status classes developed by Lemley and Myhrvold). 
57 See id. at 685 tbl.2 (defining nine technology areas, including software, optics, and elec-
tronics, and thirteen industry areas, including pharmaceuticals, communications, and transporta-
tion). This Article does not address my findings with respect to technology and industry in detail. 
Those results are tentatively reserved for a forthcoming companion piece. 
58 Both dates are found on the patent document itself. 
59 Prior foreign filing dates do not start the twenty-year term. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(3). 
60 Many patent applications blossom over time into a “family” of divisional, continuation, 
and continuation-in-part child applications, each of which may in turn spawn their own children, 
and so on. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120–121; 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b), (d) (2011) (permitting each of these 
types of applications). It is frequently these subsequent applications, rather than their parents, 
which ultimately issue patents. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 70 (2004) (noting that over half of all litigated patents issue 
from continuation applications); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber 
Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 190-93 (2008) (finding that, taking continuation applications into 
account, the PTO grants patents to more than 70% of applicants). 
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made all three maintenance fee payments and, if not, on which date the 
patent prematurely fell into the public domain.61 
2. Litigation Data 
Next, I collected enforcement data for each patent.62 Specifically, I iden-
tified: 
(a) the date each patent was first enforced: the filing date of the earliest 
complaint alleging infringement of the patent or seeking a declaration that 
the patent was not infringed or was invalid;63 
(b) the date enforcement of each patent ceased: the date on which the very 
last claim asserting infringement of the patent, or seeking a contrary 
declaration, was resolved;64  
 
61 Generally, patent owners are given a six-month grace period to pay their maintenance fees, 
and failure to pay beyond that period results in the patent’s expiration. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b). But, a 
payment made within twenty-four months after the grace period may be accepted if the delay was 
“unintentional” or “unavoidable.” Id. § 41(c). 
62 To locate the docket number of each case asserting a given patent, I cross-referenced re-
sults from three databases: (i) each case in which the patent was reported as asserted in Westlaw’s 
Derwent LitAlert database, (ii) each additional case, if any, from which a document was listed on 
Westlaw’s “citing references” for each studied patent, and (iii) each additional case, if any, 
returned by a search for the patent’s number on the Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse. To 
exclude false positives and gather litigation statistics from true assertions, I relied on PACER 
docket reports for cases filed prior to 2000 and Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse docket 
reports for cases filed in 2000 or later. The dockets for three cases filed pre-2000 were, for 
unknown reasons, not available via PACER. See Nos. 97-CV-285 (D. Nev.); 96-CV-1040 (D. 
Nev.); 95-CV-782 (W.D. Tex.). Because I could not determine when these three cases were re-
solved, I excluded the patents at issue in these cases from the analyses related to litigation end dates. 
63 Patents can, of course, be enforced without filing litigation. For a detailed discussion, see 
infra Section III.C.  
64 In suits resolved by settlement (the vast majority of cases), I identified the date on which 
the court granted the parties’ stipulated motion for dismissal or for a consent judgment. In suits 
resolved in the accused infringers’ favor, I identified the date of the jury’s verdict; the date on 
which the court granted the accused infringer’s dispositive motion to dismiss (e.g., following a ruling 
that the patentee is not the true owner of the patent-in-suit), motion for summary judgment, or 
motion for judgment as a matter of law. In the event of an appeal, I identified the date of the 
affirmance of any of the aforementioned motions. In suits resolved in the patentee’s favor, I 
identified the date on which the court awarded damages or an injunction, or, in the event of an 
appeal, the date of affirmance of these remedies. Finally, for three suits in which an unsuccessful 
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was filed, I identified the date certiorari was denied. 
I did not identify the date on which the case was “terminated”—i.e., the date on which the 
court administratively closed the case. Doing so would have counted days, months, or years spent 
litigating nonsubstantive post-trial or post-judgment issues, like motions for attorneys’ fees and 
motions for sanctions. Also, in many cases, other claims (including claims for infringement of 
other patents) continued after claims asserting the studied patent had been resolved. In these 
multiclaim cases, I identified the date specific to the claim for infringement of (or declaratory 
judgment claim against) the studied patent. 
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(c) the total number of suits in which each patent was asserted: the total 
number of unique docketed cases in which the patentee asserted the patent 
or alleged infringers sought declaratory relief from an imminent assertion, 
excluding parallel case pairs and consolidated cases other than multi-district 
litigation;65 
(d) the total number of accused infringers against which each patent was asserted: 
the total number of unique parties against which an infringement claim has 
been filed or which filed a claim seeking a declaration of relief;66  
(e) litigation outcomes: whether each patent was ever adjudicated on the 
merits and, if so, whether the outcome was a finding of infringement, 
noninfringement, or invalidity;67 and 
 
65 Accused infringers will often file suit preemptively, seeking a declaration of non-
infringement or invalidity. The vast majority of these suits are filed close in time to a mirror-
image patent infringement complaint brought by the patent owner. In fact, until recently, courts 
would only exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which the plaintiff held “a 
reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.” Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
Patentees and accused infringers often race to the courthouse (albeit in different districts) in hopes 
of ultimately consolidating both suits in their forum of choice. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, 
Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 404 (2000) 
(stating that infringers file declaratory judgment suits before patentees file infringement suits in 
order to choose the forum they think will be most favorable). As declaratory judgment plaintiffs, 
accused infringers may also hold a psychological advantage with juries. See id. at 406 fig.12 
(showing that patentees win 68% of jury trials in patentee-filed infringement actions, but only 38% 
of jury trials in accused infringer–filed declaratory judgment actions). These case pairs typically 
involve the same parties and proceed in tandem. I counted these case pairs as one suit since, for all 
intents and purposes, they are. In a similar fashion, ITC investigations often coincide with a 
patent infringement suit filed contemporaneously in district court. Again, because an ITC 
investigation brought in parallel with a patent infringement action is in essence one suit, I counted 
them as such.  
Finally, I merged data for individual suits that were so similar and contemporaneous that they 
were consolidated into a single action. The sole exception I made to this rule was for multi-district 
litigations (MDLs), which pull together a large number of cases filed over a long period of time. 
My sample included three MDLs: In re Rembrandt Techs., LP, Patent Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 
1369 ( J.P.M.L. 2007) (consolidating fifteen suits in three different federal districts); In re Acacia 
Media Techs. Corp. Patent Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378-79 ( J.P.M.L. 2005) (consolidating 
twenty suits in five districts); and In re Pabst Licensing, GmbH Patent Litig., No. 99-1298, 2001 WL 
797315, at *1 (E.D. La. July 12, 2001) (addressing seven motions filed in response to the consolida-
tion of four civil actions by the Panel on Multi-District Litigation).  
66 I excluded “John Doe” parties from this number. 
67 I did not count default judgments as “adjudications.” To make the most of extremely lim-
ited data, the litigation outcomes reported below are restricted to those at the district court level. 
The data is not adjusted to account for appellate outcomes. Analysis of district court outcomes 
alone is not uncommon in the patent litigation literature. Cf. Michael J. Mazzeo et al., Excessive 
or Unpredictable? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Infringement Awards 27-28 ( June 17, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1765891 (examining district court 
damages awards without examining subsequent changes to damages award after appeal). The 
litigation outcome data also reflects the fact that a small number of patents (four product-
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(f) suit-specific and assertion-specific statistics for litigation ongoing six years 
prior to patent expiration: the start date, date of resolution, and number of 
accused infringers for each suit ongoing within at least six years of the 
patent-in-suit’s expiration, and the start date and date of resolution of each 
individual infringement claim in those suits. 
3. Assignment History and NPE Status 
In order to compare enforcement timing among practicing and non-
practicing patentees, I also collected information concerning each patent’s 
owner, including: 
(a) each patent’s chain of ownership: the number of times each patent 
changed hands between the time it was issued and the time it was first 
asserted in court, including the dates of the first assignment after issue and 
the last assignment prior to litigation;68 and 
(b) the NPE status of each party asserting a patent: whether the entity assert-
ing each patent sold a product and, if not, what kind of NPE it was.  
For the purpose of comparing enforcement timing, I adopted the patentee 
classification system developed by Mark Lemley and Nathan Myhrvold, 
which is outlined below in Table 2. Only Class 8 patentees—those that 
produce a product—are “practicing” entities. Patentees whose status I could 
not determine fall under Class 10 and were excluded from my sample.69 
 
company patents and one NPE patent) were adjudicated multiple times with varying results. See 
Timing Dataset. 
68 I obtained this data from the PTO’s Assignment on the Web for Patents (AOTW-P). See 
Assignments on the Web > Patent Query, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://assignments. 
uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). Patent owners generally do, but are 
not required to, record assignments with the PTO. See Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the 
Transfer and Renewal of Patents, 41 RAND J. ECON. 686, 690 & n.14 (2010) (noting anecdotal 
evidence that patent transfers and related transactions are often recorded at the PTO even though 
recordation is not mandatory). Assignments recorded with the PTO within three months protect 
against ownership claims of subsequent purchasers. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). However, there are 
no other benefits or penalties associated with recording. To ensure that my data reflects only true 
transfers of ownership, I excluded any assignments that occurred merely as a result of an owner’s 
name change or minor corporate reorganization. In a number of instances, the party asserting a 
patent in litigation did not match the last-recorded owner on file with the PTO. In the vast 
majority of such cases, I was able to determine from pleadings or other litigation documents 
whether the party was an owner by unrecorded assignment or simply the last-recorded owner’s 
exclusive licensee. I excluded the few instances in which I was unable to determine the party’s 
status as unrecorded owner or exclusive licensee. 
69 Following Allison, Lemley, and Walker, I excluded Class 10 patents from my study. How-
ever, as they note, “[t]hat a diligent search could not identify what an entity did suggests that it is 
likely some form of NPE.” Allison, Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note 1, at 684 n.28. I 
excluded three patents because I was unable to determine their owners’ NPE statuses and also 
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Strictly speaking, all other classes are “nonpracticing” entities. Though 
NPEs are by no means homogeneous, for simplicity’s sake many of the 
results detailed below are reported for NPEs as a whole. Where practicable, 
however, results are broken down by entity class so that the reader may 
determine for herself where to draw the line between NPEs and “trolls.”  
 
Table 2: Entity-Status Classes70 
 
Entity Class Description 
1 Acquired patents71 
2 University heritage or tie 
3 Failed startup 
4 Failed product company 
5 Individual inventor–started company72 
6 University, Government, or NGO73 
7 Start-up, pre-product 
8 Product company 
9 Individual inventor(s) 
10 Undetermined 
11 Industry Consortium 
12 IP subsidiary of a product company 
 
 
excluded four individually owned patents that were exclusively licensed to patentees of indetermi-
nable NPE status. 
70 See Allison, Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note 1, at 683-84 & tbl.1 (describing the 
typology of entity status classes developed by Lemley and Myhrvold). 
71 There is a fine line between Class 1 and Classes 3 and 4 because many acquired patents 
come from failed product-producing companies and start-ups. In this study, I categorized a 
patentee as Class 3 or Class 4 when the entity filing suit was the failed company itself, and Class 1 
when the entity filing suit was a distinct IP-holding firm that acquired the patent, even if that 
firm’s entire portfolio appeared to be salvaged from one failed company. For example, I catego-
rized T.M. Patents, LP—a firm created to hold patent assets from the failed Thinking Machines 
Corporation—as Class 1, not Class 4. Because there is only a minor distinction between a failed 
company that began to assert its patents in its own name and a failed company that first reor-
ganized into an LLC or LP before doing the same, I report below combined results for Classes 1, 
3, and 4.  
72 In this class and in Class 9, I included patents owned by licensing companies started by 
deceased inventors’ heirs and patents owned by such heirs, respectively. A number of patents were 
litigated by family members of the named inventor after the inventor’s death. See, e.g., First 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 
4, 6-7, Black & Decker, Inc. v. Billy Star Holdings, Ltd., No. 08-1261 (D. Minn. May 12, 2008) 
(asserting a lawsuit against a licensee for failing to pay royalties to plaintiff who inherited patent 
from his deceased father, the original inventor). 
73 In my sample, it turned out that all Class 6 patents were owned by universities. See Timing 
Dataset. 
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Because many patents were owned at the time of suit by an entity of one 
class but were asserted by an exclusive licensee of another, I identified the 
patent owner and the party asserting the patent in each litigation—i.e., the 
“patentee.” Unless stated otherwise, the results reported in this Article 
identify the NPE status of the party acting as patentee in court, even if that 
party is the patent’s exclusive licensee and thus, strictly speaking, is not its 
owner.74 Figure 1 below shows the disparity between patent ownership and 
responsibility for enforcement. Notably, a significant number of NPE-
owned patents were exclusively licensed to product-producing patentees. 
All university-owned patents in my sample, and more than half of the 
individually-owned patents, were at the time of assertion exclusively 
licensed to product-producing companies that acted as plaintiffs or declaratory-
judgment defendants.75 Firms organized for the purposes of exploiting 
unused patents—patent acquisition firms, firms holding the IP assets of 
failed companies, and inventor-affiliated licensing firms—therefore account 
for nearly two-thirds of all NPE-asserted patents.76 More controversial 
NPEs account for a small minority of NPE patents and do not drive the 
results reported below.77 
Finally, it is worth noting that by happenstance my random sample did 
not select any patents owned by class 5 patentees Ronald Katz (i.e., Ronald 
A. Katz Technology Licensing, LP) or Jerome Lemelson (i.e., Lemelson 
 
74 This convention is used consistently in the literature. See Allison, Extreme Value, supra note 
1, at 10 (categorizing “the patent plaintiff ”). 
75 See Timing Dataset. In addition, one individually owned patent was asserted by a patent 
acquisition firm. Only one patent originally owned by a university found its way into the hands of 
another NPE. See id., U.S. Patent No. 5,260,093. Additionally, four patents were transferred in 
between suits to entities of a different class. One patent, initially asserted by a product company, 
was later assigned to an intellectual property–holding subsidiary. See id., U.S. Patent No. 
5,289,183. Another was asserted by a product company that subsequently failed and was reborn as 
a litigation-oriented enterprise. See id., U.S. Patent No. 5,213,670. A third was asserted by an 
individual inventor who later assigned the patent to an acquisition firm. See id., U.S. Patent No. 
5,279,051. And a final patent was initially asserted by a start-up company that subsequently failed 
and assigned the patent to a patent acquisition firm. See id., U.S. Patent No. 5,291,302. In order to 
compare litigation timing strictly across entity type, I divided these patents into multiple data 
points, one for each period of litigation supervised by a new entity type. 
76 See Allison, Extreme Value, supra note 1, at 24 (referring to “licensing companies in the 
business of buying up and enforcing patents” as “‘trolls’ by virtually anyone’s definition”); Ball & 
Kesan, supra note 3, at 14-15 (noting that licensing firms “are among the parties most frequently 
cited as the most prominent form of patent ‘troll’”). Collectively, these patentee types account for 
57 of 88 NPE-asserted patents, or 65%. See infra Table 7. Acquired patents account for 38 of 88, or 
43%. Patents asserted by inventor-affiliated licensing companies account for the remaining 19 of 
88, or 22%. Id. 
77 See supra notes 9-10. As discussed later, see infra paragraph accompanying note 99, virtually 
all individually owned patents were asserted relatively early in the patent term and, therefore, also 
do not drive the results reported below. 
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Medical Education & Research Foundation), although several litigated 
patents owned by both were issued within the study period.78 Katz and 
Lemelson are perhaps the two most famous and most prolific patent 
plaintiffs of all time, and they have what can conservatively be described as 
an outsized impact on patent litigation statistics. Both, and especially Katz, 
have a history of filing extremely large numbers of suits against extremely 
large numbers of accused infringers, and authors of previous studies have 
grappled with whether to exclude their statistics.79 The addition of even one 
Katz patent to my sample—e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,255,309 or U.S. Patent 
No. 5,251,252,80 both of which have been asserted in about eighty suits—
would have significantly increased the per-suit and per-assertion results 
reported below. 
 
 
  
 
78 Katz and Lemelson asserted at least eight patents issued during the study period. For 
Katz’s asserted patents, see U.S. Patent No. 5,297,197 (filed June 8, 1992); U.S. Patent No. 
5,259,023 (filed Dec. 3, 1991); U.S. Patent No. 5,255,309 (filed Dec. 3, 1991); U.S. Patent No. 
5,251,252 (filed Oct. 21, 1991); U.S. Patent No. 5,224,153 (filed Apr. 5, 1991); and U.S. Patent No. 
5,218,631 (filed June 8, 1990). For Lemelson’s asserted patents, see U.S. Patent No. 5,283,641 (filed 
June 16, 1993) and U.S. Patent No. 5,231,259 (filed Aug. 14, 1992). See generally Timing Dataset.  
79 In a study of patents litigated eight or more times between 2000 and 2007, Katz alone 
accounted for 60% of all studied lawsuits. See Allison, Extreme Value, supra note 1, at 26 (noting the 
enormity of the “Katz effect,” but ultimately deciding to retain Katz-related patents in the 
empirical analysis). 
80 See supra note 78. 
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Figure 1: Patent Owner–Patentee Histogram81 
 
4. Technology and Industry Categories 
Lastly, I categorized each patent by technology and industry. Rather 
than using the PTO classification system, I followed Allison, Lemley, and 
Walker’s taxonomy, which includes nine nonexclusive technology categories 
and thirteen nonexclusive industry categories listed below in Table 3.82 
 
  
 
81 See Timing Dataset. These statistics are generally consistent with Colleen Chien’s findings 
in a study of litigated patents issued in 1990, though I find a higher percentage of product 
company–asserted patents. See Chien, supra note 24, at 309, 314 (finding, in a study of 659 
litigated patents issued in 1990, that 73% were litigated by product-producing companies, 9% by 
“patent assertion entities,” and 18% by individual inventors). For the precise breakdown of NPE-
asserted patents among the various classes, see infra Table 7. 
82 See Allison, Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note 1, at 684-85 (describing the taxonomy 
I apply here). In prior work, Allison and Lemley have criticized the PTO’s rather byzantine 
classification system. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2000) (criticizing the PTO’s 
classification system as unreliable and imprecise when grouping technologies together). 
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Table 3: Technology and Industry Areas83 
 
Technology Categories Industry Categories 
1. Software 1. Computer 
2. Pure software 2. Semiconductor 
3. Software business method 3. Electronics 
4. Mechanical 4. Medical 
5. Electronics 5. Pharmaceutical 
6. Optics 6. Biotechnology 
7. Imaging 7. Chemical 
8. Biotechnology 8. Communications 
9. Chemistry 9. Transportation 
 10. Energy and utility services 
 11. Financial 
 12. Consumer goods and services 
 13. Construction 
 
Much of this data I have reserved for future research. I do, however, 
report results below that distinguish among “software,” “high-tech,” “medical 
device,” “pharmaceutical,” and “biotechnology” patents. Software patents, 
as used in this study, are those that fall within technology categories 1, 2, or 
3, regardless of the industry in which they are employed.84 I label “high-
tech” all patents covering computer, electronics, and/or telecommunications 
technology, including all software patents. These patents generally fall 
within one or more of technology categories 1-3 and 5-7, and one or more of 
industry categories 1-4 and 8-9. Finally, medical device, pharmaceutical, and 
biotech patents are classified as industry categories 4, 5, and 6, respectively. 
Medical device patents touch on almost every technology category, though 
most are strictly or primarily mechanical in nature. Some medical device 
patents—for example those covering computer- or electronically-assisted 
medical procedures—overlap with technology categories 1-3 and 5-7. 
II. RESULTS 
A. Two Patent Terms 
I begin my analysis by investigating the relative ages of patents asserted 
by practicing and nonpracticing entities. To make this comparison, however, 
 
83 See supra note 82. 
84 Categories 2 and 3 are both subsets of category 1. Allison, Extreme Value, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
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I must adjust for the fact that patents in my sample may have one of two 
different patent terms. All patents in this study issued just before a major 
event in the history of patent law: the United States’ 1994 ratification of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.85 To 
comply with the new international obligations, Congress changed the way 
United States patent law calculates the patent term for the first time since 
1952. The legislation, effective June 8, 1995, altered the patent term from 
seventeen years from issue to twenty years from filing.86 Importantly, the 
legislation created a hybrid calculation for unexpired patents issued before 
or pending on June 8, 1995.87 Every patent issued during the study period is 
included in this group. These patents receive a term of either seventeen 
years from issue or twenty years from filing, whichever is longer.88  
Thus, barring invalidation or a missed maintenance fee payment, every 
patent in this study received a term of at least seventeen years from issuance 
and at least twenty years from filing.89 The percentage of patents falling in 
each category is shown below in Table 4. For product-producing companies 
and NPEs alike, the average duration of prosecution among studied patents 
was nearly three years.90 Nonetheless, to account for these slight variations 
in the patent terms, I primarily report patent age measured in years prior to 
expiration, whether the term is calculated as seventeen years from issue or 
twenty years from filing.91 
 
 
85 The United States adopted the Uruguay Round Agreement of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. See supra note 41. The Uruguay Round Agreement included the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 101(d)(15), 108 Stat. 4809, 4814-15 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 3511(d)(15) (2006)); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
[hereinafter TRIPS agreement], adopted by United States Dec. 8, 1994, 18 U.N.T.S. 299; see also 
Evelyn Su, Comment, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169, 185 
(2000) (describing the history of the TRIPS agreement). 
86 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (providing that the term of a patent currently lasts twenty 
years from filing), with 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (providing that the term of a patent lasted 
seventeen years from issue). 
87 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (2006). 
88 Id. 
89 Patents that issued from applications less than three years old received a longer term un-
der the twenty-years-from-filing formulation. Patents that issued from applications spending 
longer than three years at the PTO received a longer term under the seventeen-years-from-issue 
formulation. 
90 NPE patents spent an average of 1094 days at the PTO (almost exactly three years). 
Product-company patents spent an average of 1089 days, just five fewer days. See Timing Dataset. 
91 When measuring backwards from expiration, I use the date the term expired or would have 
expired for patents that fell into the public domain prematurely. 
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Table 4: Patent Term92 
Event Percentage of Patents 
 Possible Term Actual Expiration 
20 Years from Filing 68.7% 56.3% 
17 Years from Issue 31.3% 25.4% 
Failure to Pay Maintenance Fee -- 14.3% 
Invalidated -- 4.0% 
B. Timing Per Patent 
Figures 2 and 3 below show the relative timing of patent enforcement 
across NPE status on a per-patent basis. Figure 2 is a histogram of the dates 
on which patents were litigated for the first time, measured backward from 
the date each patent’s term ended. Figure 3 is a histogram of the dates on 
which litigation asserting patents ended once and for all, again measured 
backward from the date of expiration. The results are dramatic. As shown 
below in Table 5, on average, product-producing companies finish enforcing 
their patents before NPEs even begin. 
Product producing–company litigation and NPE litigation follow oppos-
ing trends. On average, product-producing companies overwhelmingly 
begin litigating their patents early in the patent term, more than twelve 
years before expiration,93 and overwhelmingly finish with many years of 
patent life remaining, more than nine years from expiration.94 NPEs, on the 
other hand, begin litigating their patents much later in the term, less than 
nine years from expiration on average,95 and overwhelmingly finish in the 
final few years of the patent term, with an average of 4.4 years (and a 
median of under three years) remaining.96 
These opposing trends intersect one another about three to five years 
prior to expiration. With five years of patent life remaining, product-
producing companies have started (and in most cases finished) litigating 
over 93% of their (asserted) patents, while over 31% of NPE patents have 
 
92 See Timing Dataset. 
93 12.1 years, with a standard deviation of 4.4 years and a median of 12.7 years. See id.  
94 9.2 years, with a standard deviation of 4.9 years and a median of 9.9 years. See id. 
95 8.8 years, with a standard deviation of 5.2 years and a median of 8.5 years. See id. 
96 4.4 years, with a standard deviation of 5.0 years and a median of 2.8 years. See id. These 
statistics are comparable to prior estimates. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical 
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 237 (1998) (finding that patent suits, 
on average, are resolved 12.3 years from the application date of the patent-in-suit); Risch, supra 
note 1, at 490 (finding, among the most litigious NPEs, an average delay of 8.3 years between 
issue and filing a first complaint). 
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not yet been asserted. With three-and-a-half years of term remaining, 
product-producing companies have finished asserting more than 86% of 
their patents, while more than 59% of NPE patents remain in, or will soon 
enter, the court system. Though they constitute just one-fifth of all patentees, 
NPEs asserted almost 55% of patents litigated for the first time within five 
years of expiration and over 53% of patents in litigation resolved within 
three-and-a-half years of expiration. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Years from First Suit to Expiration97 
 
 
 
  
 
97 See Timing Dataset. For a breakdown of specific findings across patentee classes and the 
patent term, see infra Table 7. 
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Figure 3: Years from Cessation of All Litigation to Expiration98 
 
Data on the chain of ownership of these litigated patents in Table 5 sheds 
additional light on NPEs’ relatively long delay in filing suit. NPE-asserted 
patents, particularly those acquired from other firms (failed or otherwise), 
change hands more frequently over a longer period of time than their 
counterparts litigated by product-producing companies. Moreover, once 
NPE-asserted patents reach the patentee who will ultimately assert them in 
court, they sit on average for another three years before they are litigated.  
As a whole, NPE-asserted patents are three times more likely to have 
changed hands between issue and enforcement than product company–
asserted patents.99 Litigant classes 1, 3, and 4, collectively, are more than 
four times as likely to be asserting a patent that has been transferred 
between owners post-issue. And assigned patents asserted by these classes 
have changed hands roughly 50% more often per patent. Patents do not 
reach acquisition firms until about 9.5 years after issue, and these firms wait 
2.4 additional years on average before filing suit. Other NPEs fare little 
better. Inventor-affiliated licensing companies generally do not form until 
about six years after issue and, on average, wait more than five additional 
years before filing suit. And, on average, patents reach product-producing 
companies’ licensing subsidiaries about eight years after issue and sit for an 
 
98 See Timing Dataset. 
99 See id. These statistics likely understate the disparity in the rate at which product-
company and NPE patents are sold because many product-company assignments are the result of 
mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs involving all of the patent owner’s assets, not just its patent 
rights. See generally Chien, supra note 24, at 310-11 (discussing the various ways in which patents 
can be conveyed).  
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additional four years before assertion. Individual inventors, by contrast, file 
suit quickly on almost the exact same timeline as product-producing com-
panies. 
Thus, with the notable exception of those claims litigated by individuals, 
NPE-asserted patents take a long, circuitous path from the PTO to the 
courthouse that often spans more than a decade and includes multiple prior 
owners. This finding strongly suggests that it makes little sense to discuss 
the percentage of NPE litigation among all suits filed. NPEs do not obtain 
patents until the patent term is half-spent and hold their patents for several 
years more before filing suit, perhaps while waiting for emerging industries 
to mature.100 Thus, the bare statistic that NPEs account for only about one-
fifth of all patents litigated obscures the fact that NPEs account for the 
majority of patents litigated in the final few years of the term—the only 
portion of the term when NPEs are actively asserting their patent rights. 
  
 
100 Again, my findings are consistent with prior estimates in the literature. See Risch, supra 
note 1, at 490 (finding that, among patents asserted by the ten most litigious NPEs, the average 
time span between issuance and last assignment was seven years). 
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101  
  
 
101 See Timing Dataset. All statistical analysis reported in this paper was conducted using the 
Stata v.10.0 t-test, Pearson’s chi-squared, and Fisher’s exact functions, as appropriate. As explained 
above, the “percent assigned” statistics attempt to count only “true” transfers of ownership, not 
mere name changes or minor corporate reorganizations (both of which appear in PTO assignment 
records). See supra note 68. The percentage of patents assigned in the “Acquired/Failed” classes 
is not 100% because five patents remained in the name of their failed owner. The percentage of 
patents assigned in the “Individual” class is not zero because there were three assignments between 
joint inventors—for example, one co-owning joint inventor assigned his rights to the other in 
order to consolidate ownership of the patent in one inventor’s name. 
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C. Per Suit and Per Assertion 
The results above actually understate the true magnitude of late-term 
NPE enforcement. As shown below in Table 6, NPEs are far more litigious 
on average than product-producing companies. Overall, NPEs file more 
than twice as many suits per patent and assert each patent against more 
than four times as many alleged infringers.102 Moreover, NPEs are even 
more litigious late in the patent term. Per patent litigated in the last three 
years of its term, NPEs file two-and-a-half additional suits against thirteen 
additional infringers.103 
 
Table 6: Relative Litigiousness104 
 
 Prod. Co. NPE p-value 
Overall    
Suits/Patent105 1.5 3.6 < 0.001 
Assertions/Patent 2.9 12.3 < 0.001 
Litig. complete, more than 3 yrs. from exp’n    
Suits/Patent 1.4 1.7  
Assertions/Patent 2.6 5.0  
Litig. ongoing, less than 3 yrs. from exp’n    
Suits/Patent 2.6  5.2  
Assertions/Patent 5.1 18.1  
p-value 
 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
 
 
Taking into account NPEs’ relative litigiousness, NPEs’ dominance of 
late-term patent litigation grows considerably, as does their share of overall 
enforcement. Figure 4 below is a histogram of lawsuit filing dates for all 
suits filed within six years of the patent-in-suit’s expiration. Figure 5 is a 
histogram of lawsuit resolution dates for all suits resolved within six years 
of the patent-in-suit’s expiration. Both show a significant increase in NPEs’ 
late-term domination viewed on a per-suit basis. NPEs account for the 
 
102 See Timing Dataset. James Bessen et al. found a mean of 15.3 (and a median of 5) accused 
infringers per suit in a study of patent infringement cases filed by NPEs between 1990 and 2010. 
James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls 4, 31 tbl.2 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law 
Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930272. 
103 See Timing Dataset. Naturally, both product-producing companies and NPEs assert their 
oldest patents still in litigation more times than average. 
104 See Timing Dataset. 
105 Some studied patents were asserted together in the same suit, and all “per suit” data 
accounts for this fact. The rates reported in this Table, however, report the average number of suits 
in which each patent was asserted, whether or not another studied patent was asserted in the same suit.  
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majority of all new patent filings in each of the last five years of the patent 
term and account for more than 67% of all patent suits filed within five 
years of the patent-in-suit’s expiration. NPEs similarly account for the 
majority of patent suits resolved within each of the last four years of the 
patent term and account for more than 70% of all patent suits resolved 
within three years of the patent-in-suit’s expiration. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Years from Each Suit’s Filing 
to Patent-in-Suit’s Expiration106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
106 See Timing Dataset. 
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Figure 5: Years from Each Suit’s Resolution 
to Patent-in-Suit’s Expiration107 
 
 
Finally, viewed per accused infringer—or per “assertion”—NPEs’ dom-
ination of late-term patent litigation becomes even more overwhelming. 
Figure 6 below is a histogram of filing dates for all assertions filed within 
six years of the asserted patent’s expiration. Figure 7 is a histogram of 
resolution dates for all assertions resolved within six years of the patent-in-
suit’s expiration. The results in both figures are dramatic. NPEs account for 
the majority of all new patent assertions in each of the last six years of the 
patent term and, in particular, account for more than 83% of all patent 
assertions filed within five years of the patent-in-suit’s expiration. NPEs 
similarly account for the majority of patent assertions resolved within each 
of the last five years of the patent term and, particularly, for more than 83% 
of all patent assertions resolved within three years of expiration.  
  
 
107 See id. 
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Figure 6: Years from Each Assertion’s Filing to  
Patent-in-Suit’s Expiration108 
 
 
Figure 7: Years from Each Assertion’s Resolution to  
Patent-in-Suit’s Expiration109 
 
 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
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As summarized below in Table 7, by comparing patents litigated at a 
similar age (rather than all litigated patents), it is clear that NPE-asserted 
patents are the overwhelmingly dominant source of patent litigation in the 
final years of the patent term. NPEs assert the majority of new patents, file 
roughly two-thirds of new suits and file over four-fifths of new assertions in 
the final five years of the patent term. They are also responsible for almost 
identical percentages of patents enforced, and suits and assertions resolved, 
within three years of expiration. Moreover, the lion’s share of late-term 
NPE litigation is brought by patent acquisition firms, firms holding the IP 
remnants of failed companies, and inventor-affiliated licensing firms. 
Collectively, these classes account for about 92% of NPE suits active within 
three years of the patent expiration. Thus, while prior studies may have 
shown that “NPEs file only a small fraction of all patent infringement 
suits,”110 my results indicate that NPEs—specifically those NPEs most 
associated with litigation abuse111—are responsible for an enormous fraction 
of infringement claims brought late in the patent term, precisely when 
litigation seems most abusive.112 
 
  
 
110 Risch, supra note 1, at 466. 
111 See supra note 76.  
112 See Risch, supra note 1, at 490 (“The longer [NPEs] waited, the more like mythical trolls 
their behavior might appear . . . .”). 
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113  
 
 
  
 
113 See Timing Dataset. The “total suits” data was adjusted to account for the fact that some 
studied patents were asserted together in one suit. 
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D. Technology Areas and Litigation Outcomes 
The results reported above suggest that the final few years of the patent 
term primarily benefit NPEs. Compared to product-producing companies, 
NPEs as a whole—and especially firms that hold patents purely for en-
forcement—assert more patents, in more suits, and against more accused 
infringers late in the patent term. In fact, as Table 6 shows, NPEs become 
more aggressive as their patents age. NPE status and litigiousness, however, 
are not the only traits commonly associated with patent trolls. In this 
Section, I investigate the prevalence of two other stereotypical characteristics 
of patent trolls: a propensity for asserting high-tech patents and a tendency 
to lose when forced to adjudicate their infringement claims on the merits.  
In essence, this analysis further measures the extent to which NPEs take 
advantage of the tail end of the patent term. Product lifecycles in the high-
tech industry are notoriously short. Computing power, after all, doubles 
roughly every two years.114 Thus, high-tech patents are the most likely to be 
grossly out of date—technologically speaking—when asserted nearly two 
decades after their filing dates. Additionally, the success rate of NPEs in 
infringement allegations suggests that they are relying on strained claim 
interpretations to stretch aging patents to cover more advanced technology.115  
Table 8 below provides a technology-by-technology breakdown of patent 
litigation filed by product-producing companies and NPEs; the Table also 
measures changes in the division of patented technology over time. This 
data reveals that high-tech patents play a disproportionate role in NPE 
litigation and in late-term litigation generally. Overall, about 65% of NPE-
asserted patents cover computer- or electronics-related inventions, and almost 
40% cover the narrower category of software-related inventions.116 By 
contrast, just over 40% of product company–asserted patents cover high-
tech inventions and just 25% cover software-related subject matter.117 The 
 
114 This observation, which has held true for decades, is known as “Moore’s law.” See Gordon 
E. Moore, Progress in Digital Integrated Electronics, Int’l Electron Devices Meeting, IEEE (1975) 
(predicting that computing power will double approximately every two years), reprinted in SSCS: 
IEEE SOLID-STATE CIRCUITS SOC’Y NEWS, Sept. 2006, at 36, 37. 
115 See infra Table 9. 
116 Michael Risch, who used PTO classification numbers to define high-tech subject matter, 
found that 40% of patents asserted by the ten most litigious NPEs were high-tech inventions. 
Risch, supra note 1, at 477; see also id. (finding that the majority of high-tech patents in his study 
were software patents (84 of 138 total)). Bessen et al. found that 62% of patents litigated by NPEs 
between 1990 and 2010 were “software patents” and 75% covered “computer and communications 
technology.” Bessen et al., supra note 102, at 12. 
117 The difference between product-producing companies’ and NPEs’ enforcement of soft-
ware patents is statistically significant per patent (p = 0.008), per suit ( p < 0.001), and per 
assertion (p < 0.001). The difference between product-producing companies’ and NPEs’ rates of 
 
  
2013] Patent Litigation Timing 1343 
 
share of high-tech litigation by product companies is roughly the same 
whether measured by patent, by suit, or by assertion. However, for NPEs, 
high-tech litigation accounts for a substantially higher 82% of suits and 80% 
of assertions.118 
Among patents asserted in the final three years of their terms, the pro-
portion of high tech–subject matter patents increases, surprisingly, for all 
patentees. That is, high-tech patents account for an outsized percentage of 
patent claims filed in that period by both product-producing companies and 
NPEs.119 In fact, in the final three years of the patent term, the high-tech 
gap between NPEs and product-producing companies narrows considerably. 
This pattern exists not because the high-tech share of NPE litigation 
shrinks (it grows to 88% of assertions120), but rather because the high-tech 
share of product-company litigation skyrockets to over 71% of assertions.121  
 
 
 
 
 
 
enforcement of other high-tech patents is statistically significant at a 90% level per patent ( p = 
0.057), not significant per suit, and significant at a 95% level per assertion ( p = 0.029).  
118 As shown in Table 8, the difference between product-producing companies’ and NPEs’ 
share of all four technology categories is only statistically significant on a per-assertion basis 
(software p < 0.001; other high-tech p = 0.029; medical device p < 0.001; biotech-pharmaceutical 
p < 0.001). 
119 The prevalence of high-tech litigation in the final few years of the patent term, together 
with the large share of NPE litigation involving high-tech products, could suggest that my 
findings on litigation timing merely reflect the fact that high-tech patents tend to be litigated late 
in the patent term. Further analysis of my data directly contradicts this hypothesis, however. 
Product-producing companies asserting high-tech patents litigate those patents far earlier than 
their NPE counterparts. Among all high-tech patents, I find that product-producing companies 
begin enforcement with an average of 11.5 years of patent term remaining, while NPEs begin with 
just 8.3 years remaining. This difference is statistically significant (p < 0.001). Among the same 
group of patents, product-producing companies finish enforcement with an average of 9.0 years of 
term remaining, while NPEs conclude their enforcement efforts with just 3.4 years of term left. 
Again, this difference is highly statistically significant (p < 0.001). I find similar results looking at 
software patents only. On average, product-producing companies begin enforcement with 11.8 
years of term remaining and finish with 8.9 years of term left. On average, NPEs begin with 8.6 
years of term remaining and conclude just 2.9 years before expiration. These differences are both 
statistically significant ( p < 0.001 for both). 
120 This growth is statistically significant among software claims (p < 0.001) and among other 
high-tech claims (p = 0.009).  
121 While growth in the number of product-company software claims is not statistically sig-
nificant, growth in the number of other high-tech claims is highly significant (p < 0.001). Growth 
in the number of product-company high-tech suits is also significant (p < 0.001). Growth in the 
number of high-tech patents enforced by product companies is, however, not significant.  
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Table 8: Technology Areas122 
 
 Prod. Co. NPE 
 Patent Suit Assertion Patent Suit Assertion 
Overall123     
  % software 25.5 21.7 22.2 39.8* 65.6* 60.6* 
  % other high-tech 16.2 15.5 16.2 25.0** 16.3 20.0* 
  % medical device 8.4124 7.0 10.6 12.5125 4.5 5.5* 
  % bio-pharma 5.4 6.8 6.0 0* 0* 0* 
Litig. complete, more 
than 3 yrs. from exp’n126 
    
  % software 24.4 21.0 21.6 32.5 62.1 52.3 
  % other high-tech 15.2 12.9 11.5 22.5 15.9 15.9 
  % medical device 8.1 7.1 11.7 10.0 5.5 4.8 
  % bio-pharma 4.4 5.0 4.6 0 0 0 
Litig. ongoing, less 
than 3 yrs. from exp’n 
      
  % software 34.2 26.7 25.8 45.8 69.2 65.3* 
  % other high-tech 23.7 33.3* 45.4* 27.1 16.8 22.5* 
  % medical device 10.5 6.7 3.8* 14.6127 3.5 5.8 
  % bio-pharma 13.2* 18.3* 15.2* 0 0 0 
 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.10 
Finally, Table 9 displays litigation outcomes for product companies and 
NPEs, including how these outcomes change with patent age.128 The results 
suggest that NPEs lose at a higher rate than product-producing companies 
when their infringement claims are adjudicated and, again, that this disparity 
is even larger among patents litigated late in the term. The small number of 
 
122 See Timing Dataset. 
123 p-values compare product company versus NPE patents, suits, and assertions. 
124 Of the 28 product-company patents that cover medical devices, 10 (which collectively 
account for 11 suits and 15 assertions out of 35 and 102 total, respectively, involving medical 
devices), are also high-tech–related. Five of those 10, which account for 5 suits and 6 assertions, 
are software-related. See Timing Dataset. 
125 Of 11 total NPE patents that cover medical devices, 4 (which collectively account for 7 
suits and 24 assertions out of 15 and 58 total, respectively, involving medical devices), are also 
high-tech–related. One of those 4, which accounts for 3 suits and 6 assertions, is software related. 
See Timing Dataset. 
126 p-values comparing patents, suits, and assertions resolved more than and less than three 
years before expiration. 
127 Two medical device patents, which collectively account for three suits and ten assertions, 
are also high-tech related. See Timing Dataset. 
128 The data in Table 9 reports whether each patent has ever been found infringed, not in-
fringed, or invalid at the district court level before appeal. Data on appeals is not considered in 
this study. See supra note 67. 
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patents adjudicated, however, renders the detection of a statistically signifi-
cant difference difficult. Overall, more than 55% of adjudicated NPE patents 
were found by a judge or jury not to be infringed, compared with just under 
30% of adjudicated product company patents.129 Similarly, product-
producing companies proved infringement of almost half their adjudicated 
patents, while NPEs proved infringement of less than a quarter.130 More-
over, the difference between product-producing companies’ and NPEs’ 
success at proving infringement grows with time, though not because NPEs 
become worse (to a statistically significant degree, anyway). Rather, product-
producing companies become more successful. Among adjudicated patents 
litigated in the final three years of the patent term, product-producing 
companies proved infringement nearly 67% of the time,131 while NPEs fail 
to prove infringement or establish validity over 80% of the time.132 
  
 
129 The difference is significant at the 95% level (p = 0.038). 
130 This difference is significant at a 90% level (p = 0.053). Also, note that I do not count 
default judgments as “adjudications.” 
131 This increase is not statistically significant (p = 0.145). 
132 One NPE-asserted patent was found both invalid and not infringed. One possible con-
founding factor here is that, over time, it has become easier for accused infringers to locate prior 
art that restricts patentees’ ability to advance broad claim interpretations. See, e.g., F. Russell 
Denton, Plumb Lines Instead of a Wrecking Ball: A Model for Recalibrating Patent Scope, 16 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 1, 24 (2008) (noting that prior art searching “has become easier because of advances in 
search technology, online bandwidth, a growth industry in database searches . . . , and the 
appearance of free searchable PTO online databases, not to mention other public online data-
bases”); see also Allison & Lemley, supra note 41, at 138 (discussing how computer searching may 
have improved patent examiners’ ability to locate prior art). Note, however, that the invalidity 
rates reported in Table 9 do not appear to support this hypothesis. 
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Table 9: Litigation Outcomes133 
 Prod. Co. NPE p-value* 
Overall    
  Adjudicated 19.5% 21.6% -- 
  Infringed 47.7%134 22.2% 0.053 
  Noninfringed 29.2% 55.5% 0.038 
  Invalid 
*p-values > 0.10 omitted 
30.8%135   27.8%136 -- 
Litig. complete, more than 
3 yrs. from exp’n137 
   
  Adjudicated 18.0% 17.5%  
  Infringed 43.4% 28.6%  
  Noninfringed 32.1% 57.1%  
  Invalid 28.3% 28.6%  
Litig. ongoing, less than 
 3 yrs. from exp’n 
   
  Adjudicated 31.6% 22.9%  
  Infringed 66.7% 18.2%  
  Noninfringed 16.7% 54.5%  
  Invalid 41.7% 27.3%  
III. IMPLICATIONS  
The results presented above demonstrate that NPEs play a more im-
portant role in the patent system than previously recognized, a role that 
becomes fully apparent only when accounting for the age of the patents 
they litigate. In short, while NPEs do not assert the majority of litigated 
patents or even file the majority of patent suits, they play a dominant role 
in patent litigation in the waning years of the patent term. 
 
133 See Timing Dataset. 
134 One product company–asserted patent was found both infringed and not infringed in 
different cases. See id. 
135 Four product company–asserted patents were adjudicated before being invalidated. Two 
were found infringed, and two were found not infringed. See id. 
136 One NPE-asserted patent was found both not infringed and invalid. See id. 
137 The only change that is statistically significant at a confidence level of 90% or greater is 
the increase in the percentage of product company patents adjudicated, which is statistically 
significant at the 95% level (p = 0.046). 
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A. NPEs Are Mostly Not Technology Disseminators;  
Product-Producing Companies Are Not Entirely Blameless 
What does this fact mean for our opinion of NPEs? For one, it serves as 
one more nail in the coffin containing NPEs’ claims that they play a “cen-
tral role in helping commercial entities obtain the rights to use valuable 
technologies that produce new and beneficial products.”138 NPEs asserting 
patents filed by others roughly two decades ago cannot credibly claim that 
they are championing the rights of their accused infringers’ contemporaneous 
competitors. Similarly, with the notable exception of individual inventors, 
NPEs asserting their own patents are by no means rushing to the court-
house to vindicate their own rights soon after their patents issue. Instead, 
NPEs appear to be engaged in classic troll-like behavior: suing the better 
part of a well-established industry for infringement of an aging patent, 
generally one covering software or high-tech subject matter, and consistently 
losing those claims when pushed to prove their infringement allegations.139 
According to the data discussed above, NPEs’ claims that they are vin-
dicators of hard-fought patent rights become even less plausible after 
considering the breakdown of NPE-asserted patents by technology and 
industry. Almost 65% of NPE patents cover high-tech subject matter in 
general, and about 40% are software related. Worse still, more than 80% of 
NPE-filed suits assert high-tech patents generally, and more than 65% have 
software-related claims. None cover pharmaceutical or biotech inventions, 
and less than 13% cover medical devices.140 Among NPE patents asserted in 
suits ongoing within three years of their expiration, almost 46% are software 
patents and more than 72% are high-tech related. And, on a per-assertion 
basis, almost 88% of NPE patent enforcement in the final three years of the 
 
138 Kacedon et al., supra note 18. 
139 The breadth and age of NPE patents could alternatively (and more generously) suggest 
that these patents are far from stale and, instead, cover inventions so ahead of their time that it is 
not until years later that commercial applications (and thus products) emerge. A growing body of 
scholarship, however, strongly suggests that “pioneering inventions” of this sort are quite rare. See 
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 713, 715-33 (2012) (offering 
historical evidence to show that the vast majority of the so-called “pioneering inventions” of the 
past two centuries, including the steam engine, the telephone, and the lightbulb, were inde-
pendently and contemporaneously invented by multiple inventors); Brian J. Love, Interring the 
Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 429-35 (2012) (listing a large number of pioneer-
ing inventions that were independently and contemporaneously invented); Samson Vermont, 
Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 478-79 (2006) 
(listing a large number of inventions invented contemporaneously, and noting that “[s]ome 
historians and philosophers of science believe convergence is the rule rather than the exception”). 
140 Many of these medical device patents, in turn, have a significant high-tech or software 
component. See supra notes 124-25 & 127 (describing the overlap in these categories). 
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patent term is high-tech focused. In essence, where innovation is rapid and 
cheap, NPEs dominate; where innovation is slow and expensive, NPEs are 
nowhere to be found. 
Interestingly, a significant portion of product-company litigation on-
going in the waning years of the patent term fares little better. Among 
product-company patents in litigation within three years of expiration, a 
large percentage (about 58%) cover high-tech inventions. On a per-assertion 
basis, this rate jumps to over 71%. Perhaps not surprisingly, upon closer 
examination, many of the suits responsible for this jump bear the hallmarks 
of troll litigation even though they are brought by product-producing 
patentees. Several are suits filed by failing companies hoping to use patent 
litigation to keep their doors open just a little while longer. Now-bankrupt 
film and camera maker Kodak,141 for example, sued virtually every 
smartphone manufacturer, seeking $1 billion in damages for infringement of 
old software patents covering image capture, compression, and preview 
technology.142 A struggling Encyclopaedia Britannica143 launched a similar 
patent offensive against the GPS-mapping industry for infringement of its 
 
141 Kodak filed for bankruptcy in January 2012. Michael J. De La Merced, Eastman Kodak 
Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK ( Jan. 19, 2012, 1:12 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes. 
com/2012/01/19/eastman-kodak-files-for-bankruptcy. 
142 See Rich Duprey, The Worst Stocks of 2010: Eastman Kodak, MOTLEY FOOL ( Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/01/21/the-worst-stocks-for-2010-eastman-kodak.aspx 
(noting that Kodak “sees its future as being little more than a patent troll” because “[a]s its film 
business collapsed, Kodak was left with few options other than to turn to its patent portfolio to 
eke out a living”); Jason Mick, Kodak Demands Over $1B USD from Apple, RIM for Alleged 
Infringement, DAILY TECH (Mar. 25, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://www.dailytech.com/Kodak+Demands+ 
Over+1B+USD+From+Apple+RIM+for+Alleged+Infringement/article21228.htm (noting that between 
1993 and 2007 Kodak “went on a patent binge, spending on patents and acquiring small startups” 
and “beef[ed] up its digital imaging IP”); see also Complaint and Jury Claim at 2-7, Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:10-CV-06022-MAT-JWF (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010) (filing an 
action against Apple for allegedly infringing multiple Kodak patents by selling a number of 
products including iPhones, MacBooks, and iPods); Complaint at 2-3, 5, Research in Motion, Ltd. 
v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 3:08-CV-02075-K (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2008) (stating that Kodak had 
previously sent a letter to Research in Motion alleging infringement of three patents and 
“demanded exorbitant royalties from RIM for this alleged infringement,” and filing an action for a 
declaratory judgment against Kodak). Kodak recently put more than 1000 patents up for sale with 
the possibility of generating more than $3 billion in revenues. Chris Burritt, Kodak CEO Says a 
‘Large Number’ of Buyers Evaluating Patents for Purchase, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2011, 4:27 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-30/kodak-says-large-number-of-buyers-evaluating-its-
patents-1-.html.  
143 Encyclopaedia Britannica announced in March 2012 that its 2010 print edition would be 
its last. Julie Bosman, After 244 Years, Encyclopaedia Britannica Stops the Presses, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA 
DECODER (Mar. 13, 2012, 5:54 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/after-244-
years-encyclopaedia-britannica-stops-the-presses. 
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notoriously broad software patent.144 Other suits were filed by product-
producing companies that acquired patent rights purely for litigation 
purposes. Gemstar-TV Guide,145 for example, acquired the right to assert, 
among others, patents owned by former satellite-TV company Super-
Guide146 in a long-running patent battle with the DVR industry.147 Other 
product-producing companies suddenly asserted aging high-tech patents that 
had changed hands several times or asserted these patents against an entire 
industry.148 These suits, the likes of which do not occur earlier in the patent 
 
144 See Complaint for Patent Infringement and Jury Demand at 5, 8-9, Encyc. Britannica, 
Inc. v. Alpine Elecs. of Am., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-00359-LY (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2008) (alleging 
that Garmin and other defendants infringed a patent on a “novel computer search system for 
retrieving various types of information”); Encyc. Britannica, Inc. v. Magellan Navig’n, Inc., 512 F. 
Supp. 2d 1169, 1171-72 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (describing Encyclopaedia Britannica’s suit against six 
parties, including Magellan Navigation, for infringing the search system); Mike Masnick, It 
Appears that the Encyclopedia Britannica Entry on Shaking Down GPS Providers with a Bogus Patent 
Needs Updating, TECHDIRT ( June 28, 2010, 11:56 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100625/ 
2351149966.shtml (describing the history of the search system patent at issue in Encyclopaedia 
Britannica’s lawsuits against GPS companies).  
145 Gemstar merged with TV Guide, Inc. in July 2000. U.S. Settles Antitrust Case Against 
Gemstar, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at C3. Macrovision (now Rovi Corp.) acquired Gemstar-TV 
Guide in May 2008. Rafat Ali, TVGuide No More: Macrovision’s Acquisition of Gemstar Complete; To 
Be Called Macrovision Solutions, WASH. POST (May 2, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/05/02/AR2008050202391.html. 
146 See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting 
that Gemstar obtained an exclusive license from SuperGuide on three patents that would 
subsequently become the subject of litigation). 
147 See, e.g., id. at 873-74 (noting that Gemstar was impleaded as a third-party defendant to 
SuperGuide’s infringement suit, and that Gemstar alleged that defendant EchoStar infringed each 
of the three asserted patents); Certain Set-Top Boxes and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
454, USITC Pub. 3564 (Nov. 2002) (Final) (discussing an investigation into a patent-
infringement case brought by Gemstar against several companies, including Pioneer Corp. and 
EchoStar Communications Corp.); see also 2 RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNO-
LOGIES AND THE LAW § 8.05[5] (2003) (describing how Gemstar “expanded its portfolio of 
patents through various licensing arrangements” and began to enforce those rights aggressively in 
an effort to gain “a controlling position in the market for interactive program guides,” a market 
which matured to include technology far more advanced than what was envisioned in Gemstar’s 
“aging patent portfolio”).  
148 My sample included a number of high-tech patents originally assigned to AT&T Bell 
Labs that changed hands after the company’s spin-off to Lucent and eventually found their way 
into court in the mid-to-late 2000s. See, e.g., Timing Dataset, U.S. Patent No. 5,298,047; id., U.S. 
Patent No. 5,287,427; id., U.S. Patent No. 5,243,229; id., U.S. Patent No. 5,235,659. Another high-
tech patent, owned by Anvik Corp., was asserted in twelve suits against thirty-five defendants 
(essentially every flat-panel display/TV manufacturer) in the late 2000s. See Timing Dataset, U.S. 
Patent No. 5,285,236. One other software patent changed hands in 2009 and was asserted for the 
first time that same year in three suits against six defendants. See Timing Dataset, U.S. Patent No. 
5,233,629. 
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term, support one point that NPEs have made for years: product-producing 
companies are just as capable of filing suspect patent suits as NPEs are.149 
B. Patent Term Reform 
Together, the suspect quality of litigation brought by NPEs and product-
producing companies late in the patent term suggests that Congress might 
enhance innovation by shortening the patent term by three years or even 
longer. In these final years of the patent term, product-producing compa-
nies seem to have all but abandoned enforcement of patents for products 
from years earlier. Many of those product-producing companies still 
litigating aging patents appear to have the same motives and characteristics 
attributed to their much-maligned troll adversaries—and presumably 
impose the same social costs.150 All other things being equal,151 a three-year 
term reduction would impact almost 50% of all NPE suits,152 while affecting 
roughly 13% of product-company suits.153 On a per-assertion basis, a three-
year term reduction could cut short154 more than 26% of all NPE assertions 
and eliminate another 35% of NPE assertions,155 while cutting short less 
 
149 See Merges, supra note 6, at 1610-11 (“[T]ypically, it is not specific entities, but rather 
specific tactics or practices that are most relevant . . . . Trolling, to put it simply, is a matter of 
behavior rather than status.”).  
150 In a study of accused infringers’ stock prices following a lawsuit, Bessen et al. found that 
the average NPE suit cost accused infringers $122 million. Bessen et al., supra note 102, at 16. 
Between 1990 and 2010, the aggregate wealth lost to NPE suits was approximately $500 billion. Id. 
at 17. In a subsequent article, Bessen and Meurer estimate that in 2011, firms spent approximately 
$29 billion defending against NPE infringement claims. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The 
Direct Costs from NPE Disputes 19 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 12-34, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2091210. 
151 Of course, all things might not remain equal following patent term reform. See infra Section 
III.C. 
152 Of 288 total NPE suits, 72 were filed in the last three years of the patent-in-suit’s term 
and another 71 were resolved within the same time period though filed a bit earlier. See Timing 
Dataset. 
153 Of 456 total product company suits, 31 were filed in the last three years of the patent-in-
suit’s term and another 29 were resolved within the same time period though filed a bit earlier. Id. 
154 By “cut short,” I mean that the patent-in-suit would expire during litigation. Patentees 
could continue to litigate for past infringement, but they would be precluded from receiving an 
injunction or ongoing royalty after winning summary judgment or at trial because the alleged 
infringer’s future activities would no longer potentially infringe.  
155 Of 1069 total NPE assertions, 376 were brought within three years of the patent-in-suit’s 
expiration and another 278 were resolved during the same period but filed earlier. See Timing 
Dataset. 
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than 8% of product company assertions and eliminating less than 6% of 
product company assertions.156  
Though the majority of affected patents would merely expire during 
their final assertions (rather than before those are filed), there is good 
reason to believe the balance of power would still shift dramatically in these 
cases. Without live patents, patentees cannot seek permanent injunctions157 
or ongoing royalties158 even if they ultimately win their infringement 
claims. The possibility of both remedies gives patentees leverage to hold up 
accused infringers for outsized settlements.159 
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that product-producing 
companies could easily be, and as a practical matter would be, insulated 
from a term reduction to a degree greater than the statistics above suggest. 
For one, any legislation reforming the patent term could exclude practicing 
patentees in the biotech, pharmaceutical, and medical-device industries, 
which collectively assert about 24% of product-company patents litigated in 
the final three years of the patent term. Unlike their high-tech counterparts, 
these patents cover well-defined and well-known products approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and are frequently litigated at the 
very end of the patent term against generic manufacturers seeking a leg up 
in the production of low-cost alternatives to successful name brand drugs, 
diagnostics, and devices. Would a term reduction harm incentives to 
produce more of these life-saving inventions? Perhaps not. Pharmaceutical 
companies are exceedingly skillful at extending their market power over 
drugs by filing newer patents covering related subject matter—a process 
 
156 Of 964 total product company claims, 56 were brought within 3 years of the patent-in-
suit’s expiration and another 76 were resolved during the same period but filed earlier. See Timing 
Dataset. 
157 After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the possibility that a successful NPE will receive 
injunctive relief is diminished, but certainly nonzero. See 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006) (rejecting 
the Federal Circuit’s “‘general rule’ . . . that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement 
and validity have been adjudged”), rev’g MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); see also Lily Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies Restructured, 25 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 787, 798 (2009) (noting that, post-eBay, “a patentee who 
directly competes in the marketplace with the infringing party gets an injunction 79.6% of the 
time, while an NPE’s chance of an injunction falls precipitously to 33.3%”). 
158 See Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing Royalties, 76 MO. L. REV. 695, 
702-03 (2011) (noting, for example, that some courts have granted treble ongoing royalties on the 
theory that adjudicated infringers who continue to sell the infringing products are “willful” 
infringers). 
159 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2008 (explaining that a threat of injunction can 
“enable a patent holder to negotiate a settlement for an amount of money significantly exceeding 
the amount that the patent holder could expect to earn in damages based on reasonable royal-
ties . . . [because of] the cost to the defendant of switching technologies [in their products] 
midstream . . . .”).  
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known as “evergreening.”160 In fact, for this very reason, a term reduction 
would impact product-producing companies far less than one might antici-
pate because, unlike NPEs, a product company can always file new patents 
covering improved, next-generation versions of its products. That is, while 
a product company with an expired patent likely has recourse to additional 
similar patents, an NPE with an expired patent is out of luck and must 
purchase a replacement. 
In any event, it would be logistically simple to exclude medical, biotech, 
and pharmaceutical patents from any legislation curtailing late-term patent 
rights because the PTO already has experience singling out such inventions 
for special treatment. For example, current law already permits term 
extensions for patents covering products that require FDA approval.161 
These existing provisions could be reformed to lower the bar for term 
extensions or simply to exclude patents owned by the makers of FDA-
approved medicines, diagnostics, or devices from any term reduction 
reforms.162  
Excluding cases and assertions brought by pharmaceutical, biotech, and 
medical device firms, a modified three-year term reduction would impact 
less than 10% of all product-company suits and roughly 11% of assertions.163 
Taking product-company “trolling” into account would reduce this percent-
age even further. Additionally excluding those suits and assertions brought 
 
160 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. 
& TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 (2007) (providing examples of evergreening, such as “patents on 
‘metabolites’ (i.e., the products into which drugs are transformed in a patient’s body); patents on 
intermediate products used in producing drugs; patents on new uses for drugs; and patents on new 
formulations or preparations”); see also Tamsen Valoir, Six Methods of Preserving Market Exclusivity, 
18 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12, 14 (2006) (“[A] generic class of drug molecules might be 
claimed in an initial patent application, but specific members can be claimed in later unrelated 
applications as the pharmaceutical data for such members becomes available. Because the follow-
on patent does not claim priority to the original application, its term will run from the new filing 
date.”). 
161 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006) (establishing that a product patent can receive a term exten-
sion if, among other conditions, the product has “been subject to a regulatory review period [by the 
FDA] before its commercial marketing or use”). Thus, while it may be exceedingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to draw bright lines between many other industries, it appears to be relatively simple 
to separate this cohort of patents. None of the pharmaceutical, biotech, or medical device patents 
in my sample received a term extension. For a list of extended patents, see Patent Term Extensions, 
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Apr. 4, 2012, 3:57 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/ 
resources/terms/156.jsp. 
162 Requiring the commercialization of a product would exclude NPE-asserted medical 
device patents—more than 12% of all NPE patents, see Timing Dataset—from the benefit of any 
such reform.  
163 Collectively, these patentees filed fifteen suits, accounting for twenty-five assertions, 
resolved within three years of the patent-in-suit’s expiration. See Timing Dataset. 
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by the troll-like product-producing companies mentioned above, a three-
year reduction in the patent term would disrupt roughly 5.5% of “legiti-
mate” product company patent suits and assertions.164 
C. Limitations 
One thing this study cannot predict, however, is how patentees would 
adjust their litigation timing in response to a term reduction. Though, as 
discussed above, patents often do not reach NPEs for years, a substantial 
component of NPE litigation delay is simply that: delay. On average, NPEs 
wait about 3.1 years to file suit after obtaining a patent.165 Is it possible, 
then, that NPEs could dodge a term reduction simply by filing suit several 
years earlier than they presently do? The answer is almost certainly “no” for 
the vast majority of NPEs, which overwhelmingly target successful high-
tech products.166 NPEs cannot file suit before targeted products hit the 
market and generally will not do so before those products go on to become 
popular with consumers. Thus, because the lifecycles of very few high-tech 
products exceed three years, as a practical matter very few NPE claims can 
be expedited beyond three years.167 Put simply, most of the products that 
NPEs target today did not exist three years ago. In any event, requiring 
NPEs to race to the courthouse would, by itself, produce significant bene-
fits. It would, for example, force some NPEs to litigate before allegedly 
infringing products are incorporated into technology standards or costly 
fixed investments,168 thus weakening NPEs’ hold-up power.169 Nonetheless, 
the results reported above must be discounted to some extent by uncertainty 
about NPEs’ ability to sue at an earlier time. 
Further, while I have used the terms “enforcement” and “litigation” inter-
changeably above, the results of this study are only as strong as the degree 
 
164 Collectively, these patentees filed twenty suits, accounting for fifty-three assertions, re-
solved within three years of the patent-in-suit’s expiration. See Timing Dataset. 
165 See supra Table 5. 
166 See Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 1525, 1526 (2007) (noting that patent trolls “assert patents against successful companies that 
independently develop and manufacture technology without knowledge of those patents”); 
Shrestha, supra note 1, at 140 (noting that NPEs tend to sue “manufacturers of successful 
products”).  
167 See Moore, supra note 114, at 37 (observing that computing power advances at a rapid rate, 
doubling every two years). 
168 Cf. Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (2009) (describing the “snake-in-the-grass strategy” whereby patentees 
hide “the existence of patents in order to assert them against industry members who become 
locked into a standard”). 
169 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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to which the temporal bounds of litigation match those of all patent en-
forcement. Because patent licenses negotiated outside the court system are 
almost always kept confidential, it is virtually impossible to measure the 
total level of patent enforcement that product-producing companies under-
take after ceasing litigation, that NPEs undertake before filing suit, and that 
all patentees undertake with patents that are never asserted in court.  
While the amount of each type of nonlitigation patent enforcement is 
certainly nonzero, there is good reason to believe that this source of un-
certainty is not fatal to studies of this kind. First, while some NPEs do 
license their patents without litigation,170 they face at least one very strong 
incentive not to do so: the importance of forum selection. If litigation 
appears imminent, a threatened product company can and generally will file 
a declaratory judgment action in a favorable jurisdiction to prevent the 
impending suit from proceeding in a patentee-friendly district.171 What it 
almost certainly will not do is closely review unsolicited license offers from 
small NPEs.172 Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that the most 
sophisticated NPEs, especially those who are repeat players, adopt a 
litigate-first strategy, and that sophisticated product-producing companies 
do, too, when confronted with serious NPE infringement claims.  
Unlike NPEs, however, product-producing companies more frequently 
resolve patent disputes without litigation. One reason is that patent litiga-
tion is especially costly for accused infringers. Thus, unlike NPEs, which 
cannot be counter-sued for patent infringement, product-producing compa-
nies are exposed to potential patent infringement claims, and must there-
fore be careful about suing other product-producing companies.173 In 
 
170 See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-competitive Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 517 (2003) (noting that E-Data, a company that “owns a patent 
which arguably covers financial transactions on the Internet,” reportedly sent demand letters to 
75,000 alleged infringers before suing forty-one companies for patent infringement). 
171 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Inno-
vation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 921 (2001) (“When the patent holder selects the forum, the patent 
holder wins 58% of the claims. When the accused infringer brings a declaratory judgment action 
and thereby chooses the forum, the patent holder win rate drops to 44%.”). But cf. Chester S. 
Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1084 (2012) (finding a significantly higher transfer rate for 
declaratory judgment cases relative to non–declaratory judgment cases, and concluding that 
“accused infringers are often unable to secure their desired forum via declaratory judgment”). 
172 See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21-22 (2008) (noting 
that companies generally ignore patents in all stages of product development, including research 
and design, patent filing, product launches, and even after the receipt of cease-and-desist letters 
from patent owners). 
173 See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 55 (2009) (“If a defendant is sued by [a] patent troll[], the alleged 
infringers do not have the usual retaliatory mechanism—the ability to assert their own patents in 
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addition to litigation expenses, competitors face other strong incentives not 
to challenge each other’s patents. For example, they bear the cost of the 
challenge but share the benefit of invalidation with the rest of the industry, 
including competitors.174 All of these factors suggest that, among product-
producing companies, patent litigation is generally a last resort used against 
especially recalcitrant competitors. Finally, at least among product-
producing companies that actively license their patent portfolios, it is 
standard practice to license relatively large pools of patents, rather than a 
select few.175 It is unlikely that removing the oldest patents from a large 
pool would substantially reduce the pool’s value to a competitor looking to 
clear a path to commercialize a new, cutting edge product. Accordingly, 
only very little, if any, of the value of such a license should be attributed to 
the most aged patents in the pool.176 
Finally, some in the patent community perceive an increase in the share 
of patent litigation attributable to NPEs in recent years. If this trend does 
exist, my findings on late-term NPE litigation could be inflated by the fact 
that fewer NPEs existed during the 1990s and early 2000s when, perhaps, 
they might have enforced younger patents. One oft-repeated narrative 
explains the NPE business model as a recent phenomenon popularized after 
the burst of the dot-com bubble.177 Recent scholarship, however, casts 
serious doubt on this conventional wisdom. Michael Risch reports, for 
example, that large-scale NPE operations date back to at least the mid-1980s, 
 
return—because the patent troll does not sell any products or offer any services which could 
infringe.”); Crane, supra note 29, at 286 (“[T]rolls and commercializers supposedly have asymmet-
rical incentives, since trolls are only interested in exacting payments whereas commercializers 
often resolve infringement disputes with other commercializers through cross-licensing arrange-
ments.”). 
174 See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why 
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) (“[A] challenger bears the cost of litigation but its rivals 
and downstream buyers will capture almost all the benefits of successful challenge . . . .”). 
175 See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 
(2005) (“While large firms provide perhaps the most compelling example of patent portfolios in 
practice . . . we also find real world case studies of patenting behavior consistent with our theory 
among startups and acquisition-centric firms. Indeed, the rise of patent portfolios in the business 
community has become so significant that portfolios have become the credo of firm value in the 
modern innovation environment.”).  
176 See id. at 77 (“We find that for patents, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The 
true value of patents lies not in their individual worth, but in their aggregation into a collection of 
related patents—a patent portfolio.”); cf. Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of 
Functional Claiming 35 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2117302, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117302 (“Smartphone companies, for instance, would likely take little 
solace in being told that they need only clear rights for 25,000 essential patents, not 250,000.”). 
177 See, e.g., John A. Marlott, NPEs and Pre-Litigation Considerations, 1020 PLI/Pat 453, 457 (2010).  
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were very active in the 1990s, and, in some instances, markedly decreased 
their activity in the 2000s.178 Other scholars have documented the existence 
of NPEs throughout U.S. history.179 Nonetheless, there appears to be at 
least a kernel of truth to the conventional wisdom that NPEs ascended from 
the ashes of the 2000–2001 tech stock crash. Two recent studies of patent 
suits filed post-2000 suggest that the percentage of patent suits brought by 
NPEs has, on net, increased over the last decade.180 Pending additional, 
broader studies on this topic, my findings should be interpreted with the 
caveat that they reflect some degree of selection bias caused by an increase 
over time in the percentage of litigation activity attributable to NPEs.181 
D. Maintenance Fee Reform 
Is the potential disruption of roughly 5.5% of product-company asser-
tions (54 claims in this study) worth trading for the potential elimination of 
more than 35% of NPE claims and the dilution of another 26% of claims 
(654 total claims in this study)? Perhaps not, given the limitations discussed 
 
178 See Risch, supra note 1, at 475 (reporting that, of the ten most litigious NPEs since 2003, 
two filed their first suit in 1986, nine filed their first suit before 2000, and three ceased filing suits 
during the 2000s). 
179 See Merges, supra note 6, at 1592-96 (summarizing the long history of patent-related 
“rent-seeking” in the United States, especially in the agricultural industry in the 1860s and 1870s, 
in the railroad industry during the next few decades, and in the automobile industry after the turn 
of the century); see also Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 325, 
335-36 (2012) (recounting similar historical examples of patent trolling). 
180 See Chien, supra note 3, at 1604 fig.2 & n.168 (finding, in a study of 2300 high-tech patent 
suits filed between 2000 and 2008, that NPEs filed 10% of all suits between 2000 and 2001, 16% 
between 2002 and 2003, 16% between 2004 and 2005, and 20% between 2006 and 2008); Jeruss et 
al., supra note 24, at 378 (finding, in a study of 100 patent suits filed each year from 2007 to 2011, 
that the percentage asserted by “monetizers,” or NPEs, was roughly 22% in 2007, 27% in 2008, 33% 
in 2009, 30% in 2010, and 40% in 2011). Neither study makes any findings with respect to the ages 
of asserted patents.  
181 The availability of inter partes reexamination is another possible confounding influence. 
Potential infringers have the option to request the inter partes reexamination of patents filed on or 
after November 29, 1999. 37 C.F.R. § 1.913 (2011); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299-313 (2011) (developing procedures for new “post grant 
review” and “inter partes review” proceedings). Thus, during this time period, patentees 
concerned about the prospect of inter partes reexamination had an incentive to assert patents filed 
before the November 1999 deadline. Greater fear of inter partes reexamination by NPEs than by 
product-producing companies might introduce some bias into the analysis of my data. However, 
the risk of bias appears low given the infrequency of inter partes reexaminations. Compare Inter 
Partes Reexamination Filing Data—June 30, 2012, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE ( June 
2012), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/IP_quarterly_report_June_30_2012.pdf (showing that, 
since 2000, there have been 1659 total requests for inter partes reexamination), with LEX MACHI-
NA, supra note 23 (showing that more than 37,000 total patent suits were filed in the United States 
since 2000). 
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above. Furthermore, recall that the United States is a party to the Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),182 
which requires WTO member nations to offer a minimum of twenty years’ 
patent protection.183 Were the United States to formally reduce the patent 
term without first renegotiating with the WTO, it could face trade sanc-
tions from most of the industrialized world.184 
A less drastic reform, and one that has the added benefit of not violating 
the United States’ obligations under TRIPS, would be to increase the 
frequency and magnitude of maintenance fee payments in the latter half of 
the patent term. Today, patent owners are free from payment obligations 
less than twelve years after issue, not long after the tide of patent litigation 
shifts toward NPEs.185 Congress, or the PTO itself,186 could require addi-
tional annual fees for years nine through eleven and thirteen through 
sixteen (or longer) and, moreover, could substantially increase the fee 
required for each year.  
This sort of reform could operate as something of a porous de facto term 
reduction, bringing about the premature expiration of many patents that 
would otherwise end up in the hands of patent acquisition firms,187 while at 
the same time permitting product-producing companies that profit from 
lucrative confidential licensing agreements to extend their patents up to 
 
182 See supra note 85.  
183 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, at 314. 
184 TRIPS incorporates the dispute settlement provisions set forth in the General Agree-
ment on Tarriffs and Trade. See General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, arts. XXII, XXIII, 
Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S 187, 266; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 85, at 327. As a practical matter, 
however, WTO member nations including the U.S. violate various aspects of the TRIPS 
agreement quite often without ramification. See Colleen V. Chien, Tailoring the Patent System to 
Work for Software and Technology Patents 1 (Nov. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2176520 (“The open secret among international law scholars is that 
despite TRIPS’ broad pronoucnements, the treaty actually contains many flexibilities and 
exceptions.”).  
185 Under current law, maintenance fees are due at 3.5 years ($980), 7.5 years ($2480), and 
11.5 years ($4110). 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2012). Patentees that qualify as “small entities” pay 
only half this amount. Id. Those that qualify as “micro entities” pay one quarter. Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316-17 (2011) (to be codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 41). The size, but not the timing, of these fees may change soon. See infra note 191. 
186 The America Invents Act grants the PTO power to set its own fees “to recover the aggre-
gate estimated costs to the Office for processing, activities, services, and materials relating to 
patents.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 10. As interpreted by the PTO, this provision gives 
the agency “flexibility to set individual fees in a way that furthers key policy considerations.” 
Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 55,028 (proposed Sept. 6, 2012). 
187 Under the current fee regime, approximately 50% of issued patents expire prematurely for 
failure to make one of the three required payments. Dennis Crouch, Patent Maintenance Fees, 
PATENTLYO (Sept. 26, 2012, 9:51 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/patent-maintenance- 
fees.html. 
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twenty years from filing. Moreover, the rates at which patentees renewed 
their patent rights late in the term would shed additional light on the 
private value of aging patents—information that could help tailor a poten-
tial term reduction years down the road.188 
Such a reform would be far from radical.189 By international and historical 
standards, United States patent fees seem to have a considerable amount of 
room to grow. Many countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and Canada, already charge annual maintenance fees after the first few years 
of patent life.190 Also, relative to GDP per capita, United States patent fees 
this decade have been at or near an “all-time low”—about ten times cheaper 
than they were in 1800.191  
 
188 See Chien, supra note 24, at 305 (“The decision to maintain a patent signals its private 
value to the patent owner.”). Other possible reforms exist that might mitigate the costs of late-
term patent enforcement. For example, the United States could implement a rule, loosely related 
to the “working requirements” in effect in many other countries, that patent rights expire unless 
they have been the subject of at least one bona fide license or good faith patent suit within a 
certain number of years following issue. See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous 
Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 491, 595 (2007) (“[S]everal advanced developing countries including India and Brazil have 
retained domestic working requirements . . . .”). Alternatively, Congress or the courts could 
institute a new defense akin to laches that denies relief to patentees who fail to quickly seek out 
potential infringers and initiate licensing negotiations before filing suit. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The 
Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1, 50-58 (2013) (arguing that 35 U.S.C. § 287 should be 
interpreted to “reallocate the search duty to patentees”). 
189 Many commentators throughout the years have called for an increase in the size or fre-
quency of patent maintenance fee payments. See Chien, supra note 179, at 361 (noting arguments in 
favor of increasing maintenance fees that were voiced as early as the nineteenth century); 
Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J. 
ECON. 197, 208 (1999) (finding that “renewal fees should rise much more with patent length than 
existing fee schedules”); Magliocca, supra note 16, at 1836-37 (describing a “[d]ormancy 
[t]ax . . . scheme in which [maintenance] fees are sharply increased and assessed more frequently”); 
Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1551-52 (2005) (recommend-
ing annual maintenance fee payments). 
190 Renewing Your Patent, INTELL. PROP. OFFICE (U.K.), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/ 
patent/p-manage/p-renew.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (explaining that in the UK patents must 
be renewed “on the 4th anniversary of the filing date and every year after that . . . up to 20 
years”); GERMAN PATENT & TRADE MARK OFFICE, PCT APPLICANT’S GUIDE 5 (2012), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/gdvol2/annexes/de.pdf (explaining that fees are 
“payable for the third and each subsequent year following the international filing date”); 
CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE § 24.02.01 
(last updated 2010), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/ 
rpbb-mopop-eng.pdf (“In order to maintain a patent application in effect, an applicant must pay 
maintenance fees for each one-year period from the second anniversary of the filing date of the 
application.”). 
191 Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe, The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: 
Theory and Evidence 6 (Intellectual Prop. Research Inst. of Austl., Working Paper No. 7/10, 2010), 
available at http://www.ipria.org/publications/wp/2010/Working%20Paper%207_2010.pdf. Recently 
proposed changes to the maintenance fee schedule would increase (for small and large entities) the 
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CONCLUSION 
Whatever the precise mechanism employed, the results presented in this 
Article suggest that society might be better off if patent rights diminished 
earlier than they do under current law. In a world in which at least some 
products are out of date by the time they hit store shelves, the last few years 
of a two decade–long patent term seem unlikely to incentivize greater 
innovation. To the contrary, it appears that the waning years of patent 
protection primarily benefit litigation-oriented patentees who do little more 
with their aging patent rights than impose steep legal costs on those selling 
successful products. Perhaps through future research that dispels concerns 
raised by the limitations discussed above, we will soon gain a deeper 
understanding of the practical costs and benefits of the final years of the 
patent term that will spur legislative action to trim the nation’s ever-
increasing thicket of aging patents.  
 
first fee by 42%, the second by 26%, and the third by 56%. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 
77 Fed. Reg. 55,028, 55,040 tbl.4 (proposed Sept. 6, 2012) (displaying the current and proposed 
fee structure). 
